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ABSTRACT
This Article is the first to analyze prison location and its
relationship to U.S. and international theories of criminal
punishment. Strangely, scholarly literature overlooks criminal
prison designation procedures—the procedures by which a court
or other institution designates the prison facility in which a
recently convicted individual is to serve his or her sentence. This
Article identifies this gap in the literature—the prison location
omission—and fills it from three different vantage points:
(1) U.S. procedural provisions governing prison designation; (2)
international
procedural
provisions
governing
prison
designation; and (3) the relationship between imprisonment and
broader theories of criminal punishment. Through comparison
of U.S. and international prison designation systems, this
Article argues that prison location materially advances core
rationales of criminal punishment.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Sentencing constitutes the backbone of criminal justice, the
culmination of criminal adjudication. 1 Indeed, the criminal justice
system inflicts pain—in the form of deprivation of life, liberty, or
property—on those convicted of criminal conduct.2 Where a prisoner
serves time often crucially determines how much of a deprivation he
or she will suffer, yet academic literature has neglected this crucial
sentencing component. 3 Indeed, scholars have never systematically
reviewed prison designation procedures—the procedures by which a
court or other institution designates the prison facility in which a
convict will serve his or her sentence—at the state, federal, or
international levels. Furthermore, commentators have failed to
analyze how prison location advances the broader goals of criminal
justice—deterrence, retribution, incapacitation, and rehabilitation—
as well as emerging theories of victim-related “restorative justice” and
“transitional justice.” Regrettably, most scholarship singularly
focuses on prison duration as the defining aspect of a sentence,
although prison location may be as, if not more, important to the
retributive or deterrent effect of a sentence. For example, had Osama
bin Laden been captured, convicted of crimes, and sentenced to a
term of imprisonment, it would have undoubtedly mattered whether
he served his time in New York, The Hague, Saudi Arabia, or
elsewhere.
This Article contends that prison location itself endows a
sentence with additional meaning that in turn advances overarching
theories of criminal punishment, such as deterrence to the individual
and the community, incapacitation of the offender, and the provision
of justice to victims. The Article reviews both U.S. federal and
international prison designation procedures and then compares the
essential features of these U.S. and international prison designation
paradigms in an effort to contribute to criminal law theory, American
criminal legal studies, and international criminal legal studies.

1.
ANTONIO CASSESE ET AL., THE ROME STATUTE OF THE INTERNATIONAL
CRIMINAL COURT: A COMMENTARY 1752 (2002).
2.
JOSHUA DRESSLER, UNDERSTANDING CRIMINAL LAW 11 (6th ed. 2012).
3.
This Article will use the terms prison location, place of imprisonment, and
imprisonment location interchangeably.
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A. The Prison Location Omission in Current Scholarship
Simply put, scholarship undervalues prison location. This Article
hereinafter uses the term prison location omission to denote the gap
in scholarly attention to the procedures by which prison facilities are
designated and the way such locations fulfill the broader goals of
criminal punishment.
This prison location omission reveals itself throughout U.S.
scholarship on criminal sentencing. Often, sentencing articles have
focused on the duration of sentences, 4 as well as the reasoning
underlying sentencing decisions5 or the use of private prisons in the
state and federal system.6 Indeed, one commentator has underscored
the centrality of sentence duration as a yardstick for measuring
retribution:
The length of a term of imprisonment is, obviously, not the only
possible indicator of retributive value. Nor is it evidence that the mere
addition of several years to a sentence necessarily augments its
retributive force; or that shortening a sentence by several years guts
that force. However, length of a sentence constitutes the central—and,
basically, only—measurement device that liberal legalist institutions
practically avail themselves of when it comes to operationalizing
punishment in extant sentencing frameworks.7

4.
See, e.g., Christopher Slobogin & Lauren Brinkley-Rubinstein, Putting
Desert in Its Place, 65 STAN. L. REV. 77, 123–24 (2013) (reviewing and testing the
“hypotheses underlying [the] empirical desert theory” and suggesting, ultimately, that
formulating criminal sentences in light of societal views does not optimize crime
control); see also Jesse J. Norris, Should States Expand Judicial Sentence
Modification? A Cautionary Tale, 35 HAMLINE L. REV. 101, 131 (2012) (supporting the
allowance of sentence modifications at any time throughout the duration of a sentence
as an effective means of enabling courts to correct unfair sentences); Cecelia Klingele,
Changing the Sentence Without Hiding the Truth: Judicial Sentence Modification as a
Promising Method of Early Release, 52 WM. & MARY L. REV. 465 (2010) (promoting
judicial sentence modification); Nancy Armoury Combs, Procuring Guilty Pleas for
International Crimes: The Limited Influence of Sentence Discounts, 59 VAND. L. REV. 69
(2006) (“[E]xplor[ing] the role of sentencing discounts in the guilty-plea decisions of
international defendants.”). More generally, “[t]he lack of attention to sentencing
procedures has been one of the greatest failings of the last century’s sentencing reform
movement and is the cause of much of the current upheaval in federal sentencing.”
Margareth Etienne, Parity, Disparity, and Adversariality: First Principles of
Sentencing, 58 STAN. L. REV. 309, 310 (2005).
5.
See Etienne, supra note 4, at 310 (positing that, among other things,
sentencing decisions are affected by a conscious commitment to the elimination of
sentence disparities).
6.
Sharon Dolovich, State Punishment and Private Prisons, 55 DUKE L.J. 437,
440 n.4 (2005) (describing the debate over private prisons as having “generated a
voluminous literature”); see also, e.g., Ira P. Robbins, The Legal Dimensions of Private
Incarceration, 38 AM. U. L. REV. 531, 540 (1989) (“The idea is to remove the operation
(and sometimes the ownership) of an institution from the local, state, or federal
government and turn it over to a private corporation.”).
7.
MARK A. DRUMBL, ATROCITY, PUNISHMENT, AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 106
(2007).
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In this commentator’s submission, sentence length is the sole
means of gauging the retributive nature of a sentence. Furthermore,
with regard to deterrence, another commentator has similarly noted
that “there has been no systematic attempt to estimate the deterrent
effect of punitiveness other than incarceration length.”8
The prison designation omission may owe itself to the visibility of
sentence duration, which is often delivered by a federal judge or jury.
This prominent aspect of criminal sentencing thus gains academic
traction, along with other salient procedural aspects such as, say, the
Miranda rights of a criminal suspect. As such, scholars have
completely neglected the prison designation process, which falls
under the exclusive authority of a subdivision of the U.S. Department
of Justice (DOJ). Existing literature only tangentially refers to the
plain statutory designation language en route to an argument
unrelated to imprisonment location.9,10 Indeed, the Bureau of Prisons’

8.
Id. at 148.
9.
See, e.g., Alexander Volokh, Prison Vouchers, 160 U. PA. L. REV. 779, 793
(2012) (“When assigning prisoners to federal prisons, the Bureau of Prisons (BOP) is
required to consider ‘the resources of the facility contemplated,’ ‘the nature and
circumstances of the offense,’ ‘the history and characteristics of the prisoner,’ ‘any
statement’ by the sentencing court ‘concerning the purposes for which the
sentence . . . was determined to be warranted,’ and Sentencing Commission policy
statements.”) (footnotes omitted); Adam J. Kolber, The Comparative Nature of
Punishment, 89 B.U. L. REV. 1565, 1574 n.17 (“Similarly, federal statutes require that
when the Bureau of Prisons makes prisoner facility assignments, ‘there shall be no
favoritism given to prisoners of high social or economic status.’” (quoting 18 U.S.C.
§ 3621(b))); S. David Mitchell, Impeding Reentry: Agency and Judicial Obstacles to
Longer Halfway House Placements, 16 MICH. J. RACE & L. 235, 243 (2011) (“Congress
specifically required that the Bureau of Prisons, under § 3621(b), designate an inmate’s
place of imprisonment, but granted the agency the discretion to determine the
appropriate facility.”) (footnote omitted); Amy L. Codagnone, Comment, Administrative
Law—Bureau of Prisons Statutory Mandate Permits Creation of Categorical Rules to
Guide Prison Placement Discretion—Muniz v. Sabol, 517 F.3d 29 (1st Cir. 2008), cert.
denied, 129 S. Ct. 115 (2008), 42 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 285, 285, 287 (2009) (“Congress
delegates authority to the Bureau of Prisons (BOP) to place inmates. In determining
inmate placement, the BOP must consider five individualized factors before selecting a
suitable penal facility for each inmate. . . . Congress vested the BOP with the authority
to assign inmates to any available penal or correctional facility that meets the
minimum standards of health and habitability after considering five factors.”)
(footnotes omitted); Robbins, supra note 6, at 758–67 (reviewing the legislative history
and plain language of 18 U.S.C. § 3621(b)). There has also been one article reviewing
court location and its effect on criminal sentences. Thomas L. Austin, The Influence of
Court Location on Type of Criminal Sentence: The Rural-Urban Factor, 9 J. INT’L CRIM.
JUST. 305 (1981). Indeed, often designation is overlooked as a step in criminal
procedure, including in those that review criminal sentencing. See, e.g., ELLEN S.
PODGOR ET AL., CRIMINAL LAW: CONCEPTS AND PRACTICE 8–47 (2005) (reviewing as
integral to criminal sentencing the role of the lawyer, the burden of proof, the standard
of review, indeterminate sentencing, sentencing guidelines, mandatory sentencing
guidelines and mandatory minimum sentences, proportionality, and capital
punishment, with no consideration of prison location as an essential aspect of a
criminal sentence).
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(BOP) Program Statement regarding prison designation—the primary
source for every prison designation at the federal level—has never
received substantial scrutiny.11
Though more scholars have considered international designation
procedures, 12 the prison location omission also manifests itself in

10.
Indeed, the only law journal article to include the phrase “place of
imprisonment,” “location of imprisonment,” or any related phrase dates from 1903. See
Recent Case, Conflict of Laws – Territorial Laws – Place of Imprisonment, 16 HARV. L.
REV. 521 (1903).
11.
U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, FED. BUREAU OF PRISONS, PROGRAM STATEMENT
(2006) [hereinafter BOP PROGRAM STATEMENT], available at http://www.bop.gov/
policy/progstat/5100_008.pdf; see also, e.g., Volokh, supra note 9, at 793 n.63 (2012)
(“While the BOP's regulations seem to accommodate sentencing court
recommendations, generally there's no guarantee that the court will convey the
prisoner's preferences and no systematic way for prisoners to have their preferences
satisfied.”); Eumi K. Lee, Commentary, An Overview of Special Populations in
California Prisons, 7 HASTINGS RACE & POVERTY L.J. 223, 235 n.61 (2010) (noting that
in the federal prison system higher security classification is based merely on
noncitizenship).
12.
See generally Hirad Abtahi & Steven Arrigg Koh, The Emerging
Enforcement Practice of the International Criminal Court, 45 CORNELL INT’L L.J. 1, 6–
10 (2013) (discussing pre-enforcement requirements and procedures); Ariel Zemach,
Reconciling Universal Jurisdiction with Equality Before the Law, 47 TEX. INT’L L.J.
143, 163–64 (2011) (advocating reform to limit universal jurisdiction); Cesare P.R.
Romano, Can You Hear Me Now? The Case for Extending the International Judicial
Network, 10 CHI. J. INT’L L. 233, 263 n.123 (2009) (“According to the Statute of the
Tribunal, sentences of imprisonment ‘shall be served in Rwanda or any of the States on
a list of States which have indicated to the Security Council their willingness to accept
convicted persons, as designated by the ICTR.’”); Sanja Kutnjak Ivković, Justice by the
International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, 37 STAN. J. INT’L L. 255,
290 (2001) (“Prison sentences are to be served in a state designated by the ICTY.”);
Sean D. Murphy, Progress and Jurisprudence of the International Criminal Tribunal
for the Former Yugoslavia, 93 AM. J. INT’L L. 57, 93 (1999) (reviewing the ICTY Rule of
Procedure and Evidence 103, which governs the place of imprisonment); Madeline H.
Morris, The Trials of Concurrent Jurisdiction: The Case of Rwanda, 7 DUKE J. COMP. &
INT’L L. 349, 364 n.82 (1997) (“A prison sentence imposed by the ICTR may be served in
Rwanda or in any other State that has ‘indicated to the Security Council their
willingness to accept convicted persons, as designated by the International Tribunal for
Rwanda.’”); David Tolbert & Åsa Rydberg, Enforcement of Sentences, in ESSAYS ON
ICTY PROCEDURE AND EVIDENCE IN HONOUR OF GABRIELLE KIRK MCDONALD 533–43
(Richard May et al. eds., 2001); OTTO TRIFFTERER, COMMENTARY ON THE ROME
STATUTE OF THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT: OBSERVERS’ NOTES, ARTICLE BY
ARTICLE 1647–85 (2d ed. 2008); WILLIAM A. SCHABAS, THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL
COURT: A COMMENTARY ON THE ROME STATUTE 1065–114 (Philip Alston & Vaughan
Lowe eds., 2010) (broadly covering the ICC’s enforcement regime); CASSESE ET AL.,
supra note 1, at 1751–840. Some articles have addressed the theories underlying
international criminal punishment, though without considering designation. See, e.g.,
Andrew K. Woods, Moral Judgments & International Crimes: The Disutility of Desert,
52 VA. J. INT’L L. 633, 656–57 (2012); Inés Mónica Weinberg de Roca & Christopher M.
Rassi, Sentencing and Incarceration in the Ad Hoc Tribunals, 44 STAN. J. INT’L L. 1, 2
(2008) (reviewing the “discrepancies between the sentencing and incarceration
practices of the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia and the
International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda”); Dirk van Zyl Smit, International
Imprisonment, 53 INT’L COMP. L.Q. 357 (2005) (reviewing the status and condition of
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international legal scholarship. 13 Each relevant article reviews
designation procedures within the context of one particular tribunal;
there has been little to no comparative work describing the overall
framework of international prison designation nor any contemplation
of the relationship between prison location and key theories of
international criminal justice.14
This Article will not analyze the length of sentence, the type of
sentence, or any other sentence-related matters previously
emphasized in criminal legal scholarship. While existing literature
amply addresses the duration and type of criminal sentence, a dearth
of scholarship focuses on the interstitial link between the moment of
sentence delivery and the first step a prisoner takes into his or her
cell.
Some might claim that the prison location omission is not
accidental, but only proves that this area is unworthy of critical
study. The aim of punishment, this argument goes, is “simply to mete
out an appropriate punishment to a wrongdoer.” 15 But even this
claim implicitly assumes that punishment serves retributive ends,
thus invoking the prospect of additional sentencing rationales.
Furthermore, punishment never transpires in a vacuum; it inexorably
occurs within the confines of a physical space located in a city, state,
and country. Thus, prison location inherently binds itself to every
sentence and demands academic scrutiny.
B. The Benefit of International Comparison
International criminal justice provides an additional perspective
that helps rectify the prison location omission. The distinctive
international prison designation procedure operates more overtly—
involving the transfer of prisoners across national borders pursuant
to bilateral enforcement agreements concluded between States16 and
the international tribunals—than at the U.S. federal level. 17
Furthermore, the emerging field of international criminal justice has
now reached its adolescence, making it an ideal time for renewed
academic review. 18 The International Criminal Court (ICC) has

ICTY and ICTR detainees and convicted prisoners without considering the process by
which individuals may move from detention to imprisonment).
13.
See supra note 12.
14.
See supra note 12.
15.
DAVID ORMEROD, SMITH AND HOGAN CRIMINAL LAW 4 (12th ed. 2008).
16.
Throughout this Article, States (capitalized) will refer to countries whereas
states (uncapitalized) will refer to states within the United States of America.
17.
See BOP PROGRAM STATEMENT, supra note 11, ch. 3, at 1–11 (discussing
the security designation procedures for new commitments).
18.
Though these six international criminal institutions differ in nomenclature
(e.g., tribunal, court, chamber, special court, special tribunal), for ease of discussion
they will collectively be referred to as tribunals.
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delivered its first judgment of conviction and issued its first sentence;
the first sentencing appeal judgment is imminent. 19 The
International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) is
in the process of trying its final major trials20 alongside a bevy of
significant appeals. 21 The International Criminal Tribunal for
Rwanda (ICTR) is concluding operations now falling under the
Mechanism for International Criminal Tribunals (MICT). 22 The
Special Court for Sierra Leone and Extraordinary Chambers in the
Courts of Cambodia are significantly advanced in their mandates,
while the Special Tribunal for Lebanon begins its first trials next
year. 23 As these institutions have matured, the lion’s share of
academic literature has focused upon matters such as joint criminal
enterprise, 24 the scope of genocide, 25 or complementarity. 26 But

19.
See INT’L CRIM. CT., CASE INFORMATION SHEET: SITUATION IN THE
DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF THE CONGO: THE PROSECUTOR V. THOMAS LUBANGA DYILO,
CASE NO. ICC-01/04-01/06 (2012), available at http://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/PIDS/
publications/LubangaENG.pdf (finding Thomas Lubanga Dyilo guilty “of the war
crimes of enlisting and conscripting of children under the age of 15 years and using
them to participate actively in hostilities”).
20.
The Cases: Cases at Trial, INT’L CRIM. TRIB. FOR THE FORMER YUGOSLAVIA,
http://www.icty.org/action/cases/4 (last visited Oct. 18, 2013) (noting, e.g., the
Prosecutor v. Karadžić, Prosecutor v. Mladić, and Prosecutor v. Hadžić cases).
21.
The Cases: Cases on Appeal, INT’L CRIM. TRIB. FOR THE FORMER
YUGOSLAVIA, http://www.icty.org/action/cases/4 (last visited Oct. 18, 2013) (noting, e.g.,
the Prosecutor v. Popović et al., Prosecutor v. Šainović et al., and Prosecutor v. Prlić et
al. cases).
22.
See
Status
of
Cases,
INT’L
CRIM.
TRIB.
FOR
RWANDA,
http://www.unictr.org/Cases/tabid/204/Default.aspx (last visited Oct. 18, 2013) (noting
that the ICTR currently has no cases in progress, having completed seventy-five cases).
23.
Trial Chamber Holds Its First Pre-trial Hearing, SPECIAL TRIB. FOR
LEBANON,
http://www.stl-tsl.org/en/media/press-releases/29-10-2013-trial-chamberholds-its-first-pre-trial-hearing (last visited Nov. 19, 2013).
24.
See, e.g., Jared L. Watkins & Randle C. DeFalco, Joint Criminal Enterprise
and the Jurisdiction of the Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia, 63
RUTGERS L. REV. 193 (2010); Ian M. Ralby, Joint Criminal Enterprise Liability in the
Iraqi High Tribunal, 28 B.U. INT’L L.J. 281 (2010); Catherine H. Gibson, Testing the
Legitimacy of the Joint Criminal Enterprise Doctrine in the ICTY: A Comparison of
Individual Liability for Group Conduct in International and Domestic Law, 18 DUKE J.
COMP. & INT’L L. 521 (2008); Allen O’Rourke, Recent Development, Joint Criminal
Enterprise and Brđanin: Misguided Overcorrection, 47 HARV. INT'L L.J. 307 (2006);
Allison Marston Danner & Jenny S. Martinez, Guilty Associations: Joint Criminal
Enterprise, Command Responsibility, and the Development of International Criminal
Law, 93 CAL. L. REV. 75 (2005).
25.
See, e.g., Grant Dawson & Rachel Boynton, Reconciling Complicity in
Genocide and Aiding and Abetting Genocide in the Jurisprudence of the United Nations
Ad Hoc Tribunals, 21 HARV. HUM. RTS. J. 241 (2008); Jide Nzelibe, Courting Genocide:
The Unintended Effects of Humanitarian Intervention, 97 CAL. L. REV. 1171 (2009);
Daphne Anayiotos, The Cultural Genocide Debate: Should the UN Genocide Convention
Include a Provision on Cultural Genocide, or Should the Phenomenon Be Encompassed
in a Separate International Treaty?, 22 N.Y. INT'L L. REV. 99 (2009); George A.
Critchlow, Stopping Genocide Through International Agreement When the Security
Council Fails to Act, 40 GEO. J. INT'L L. 311 (2009); David L. Nersessian, Comparative

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3047445

2013]

geography and justice

1275

scholars have given comparatively little attention to the mechanics or
theories of international criminal sentencing, despite the
incarceration of over one hundred individuals pursuant to this
regime.27
Part II of this Article reviews U.S. federal prison designation
procedures and argues that certain essential features characterize
this U.S. prison designation paradigm. Part III reviews the analogous
international procedures and similarly distills the essence of the
international prison designation paradigm. Part IV compares these
two paradigms to reveal the key issues at stake in the prison
designation process. Part V argues that prison location advances core
theories of criminal punishment. Part VI is a conclusion.
II. THE U.S. PRISON DESIGNATION PARADIGM
This Part begins redressing the prison location omission by
reviewing and analyzing the U.S. system of prison designation and
arguing that certain essential features characterize this U.S. prison
designation paradigm. This Part ultimately contends that this
paradigm has four defining features: (1) a federal court conviction and
sentence, (2) the transfer of relevant sentencing materials to the
BOP, (3) the BOP’s designation of a prison facility based on minimum

Approaches to Punishing Hate: The Intersection of Genocide and Crimes Against
Humanity, 43 STAN. J. INT'L L. 221 (2007).
26.
See, e.g., Kevin Jon Heller, A Sentence-Based Theory of Complementarity,
53 HARV. INT'L L.J. 85 (2012); Alhagi Marong, Unlocking the Mysteriousness of
Complementarity: In Search of a Forum Coveniens for Trial of the Leaders of the Lord’s
Resistance Army, 40 GA. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 67 (2011); Lars Waldorf, “A Mere Pretense
of Justice”: Complementarity, Sham Trials, and Victor’s Justice at the Rwanda
Tribunal, 33 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 1221 (2010); Michael A. Newton, The
Complementarity Conundrum: Are We Watching Evolution or Evisceration?, 8 SANTA
CLARA J. INT'L L. 115 (2010); Alexander K.A. Greenawalt, Complementarity in Crisis:
Uganda, Alternative Justice, and the International Criminal Court, 50 VA. J. INT'L L.
107 (2009); Dawn Yamane Hewett, Sudan’s Courts and Complementarity in the Face of
Darfur, 31 YALE J. INT'L L. 276 (2006); Mohamed M. El Zeidy, The Principle of
Complementarity: A New Machinery to Implement International Criminal Law, 23
MICH. J. INT'L L. 869 (2002).
27.
See SILVIA D’ASCOLI, SENTENCING IN INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW: THE
UN AD HOC TRIBUNALS AND FUTURE PERSPECTIVES FOR THE ICC 2–3, 34 (2011)
(“[T]here is a serious need to re-examine the current justifications of punishment in
international sentencing practice, as recent approaches are confused and unclear and
there is a lack of clarity from the ad hoc Tribunals in addressing the fundamental
issues of sentencing.”); Key Figures of the Cases, INT’L CRIM. TRIB. FOR THE FORMER
YUGOSLAVIA, http://www.icty.org/sections/TheCases/KeyFiguresoftheCases (last visited
Oct. 18, 2013) (reporting statistics about proceedings before the ICTY); Completed
Cases, INT’L CRIM. TRIB. FOR RWANDA, http://www.unictr.org/Cases/tabid/77/
Default.aspx?id=4&mnid=4 (last visited Oct. 18, 2013) (listing 44 completed cases to
date); Cases, SPECIAL CT. FOR SIERRA LEONE, http://www.sc-sl.org/CASES/
tabid/71/Default.aspx (last visited Oct. 18, 2013).
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guarantees and discretionary factors, and (4) the convicted
individual’s transfer to the designated prison facility.28
Before embarking on this analysis, as a preliminary matter, one
may ask—What is criminal punishment? First, punishment is
performed by and directed against responsible individuals.29 Second,
it entails designedly harmful or unpleasant consequences. 30 Third,
such unpleasantness is “preceded by a judgment of condemnation” in
which the punished individual is blamed explicitly for the
wrongdoing.31 Fourth, it is imposed by a person or individual with the
requisite authority to do so. 32 Fifth, it is imposed because of a
violation of some established rule of conduct.33 Sixth, it is imposed on
a violator of such a rule. 34 Criminal punishment may take many
forms, including capital punishment, incarceration, fines, and
community service.35

28.
In the interest of concision, this Article has omitted U.S. state prison
designation procedures. However, future research could illuminate the similarities and
differences between state and federal procedures, as well as the distinctions between
state prison designation paradigms. For example, generally state legislatures endow
state correctional officials with designation authority, leaving courts without authority
to specify a particular place of imprisonment. See, e.g., 24 C.J.S. Criminal Law § 2188
(2013) (citing People v. Lara, 202 Cal. Rptr. 262 (Cal. Ct. App. 1984); State v.
Desjarlais, 714 P.2d 69 (Idaho Ct. App. 1986)). However, trial courts in some states
may have discretion to designate the place of imprisonment. See, e.g., 24 C.J.S.
Criminal Law § 2188 (2013) (citing Thomas v. State, 301 S.W.2d 358 (Tenn. 1957)); see
also 6A C.J.S. Assault § 163 (2013) (citing People v. Hayes, 96 Cal. Rptr. 879, 886 (Cal.
Ct. App. 1971)). In other states, juries may also set the place of confinement. See, e.g.,
24 C.J.S. Criminal Law § 2188 (2013) (citing Hopper v. State, 326 S.W.2d 448 (Tenn.
1959)). Furthermore, designation of imprisonment at the state level relies on numerous
factors, including: separation from companions, protection from enemies, requirements
of varying levels of security, examination and treatment by medical authorities,
availability of friends or family, possibility of employment or education, and past and
anticipated future behavior of the prisoner. See 24 C.J.S. Criminal Law § 2188 (citing
Petition of Peiffer, 166 A.2d 325 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1960); Thomas v. State, 301 S.W.2d 358
(Tenn. 1957); Meachum v. Fano, 427 U.S. 215 (1976)). A dominant consideration in
sentencing is also whether a convicted individual may serve in a county or state
penitentiary based on the type of offense (felony vs. misdemeanor) and length of time
served (longer time served tends toward designation in a state facility). 24 C.J.S.
Criminal Law § 2188 (citing Jackson v. State, 68 So. 2d 850 (Ala. Ct. App. 1953); In re
Thomas, 306 S.W.2d 336 (Mo. Ct. App. 1957)).
29.
Kent Greenawalt, Punishment, in 3 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF CRIME & JUSTICE
1282 (Joshua Dressler et al. eds., 2d ed. 2002).
30.
Id.
31.
Id.
32.
Id. at 1283.
33.
Id.
34.
Id. See also SUSAN EASTON & CHRISTINE PIPER, SENTENCING AND
PUNISHMENT: THE QUEST FOR JUSTICE 4 (2005) (“Punishment rests on moral reasons,
the expression of moral condemnation, in response to rule-infringements.”); DRESSLER,
supra note 2, at 12 (Unfortunately, “[t]here is no universally accepted non-arbitrary
definition of the term ‘punishment’”).
35.
See WAYNE R. LAFAVE & AUSTIN W. SCOTT, JR., SUBSTANTIVE CRIMINAL
LAW 12 (1986) (“The modern criminal penalties are: the death penalty, imprisonment
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Additionally, American sentencing is broadly divisible into state
and federal practices. As of 2011, there were 1,598,780 individuals
serving sentences in state and federal prisons—an incarceration rate
of 492 per 100,000 U.S. residents36—which ranks the United States
amongst countries with the highest rates of incarceration in the
world. 37 That same year, 89.8 percent of individuals convicted of
federal offenses were convicted to a term of imprisonment.38 As of
November 2012, 199,729 individuals were serving federal sentences
in federal prisons or prisons in other facilities sanctioned by the BOP,
an institution within the DOJ.39 The BOP, established in 1903, now
includes a central office headquarters and six regional offices, which
provide administrative oversight and support to 118 correctional
institutions and 22 “residential reentry management offices.” 40
Residential reentry management offices oversee both residential
reentry centers and home confinement programs.41

with or without hard labor, and the fine.”); see also, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 53a28(b)–(c) (2013) (listing as authorized sentences, individually and in various
combinations, a term of imprisonment; confinement; fine; suspended sentence of
imprisonment with a fine, period of probation, conditional discharge; a sentence of
unconditional discharge; or a term of imprisonment and a period of special parole);
18 U.S.C. §§ 3551–3586 (2012) (listing probation, fines, and imprisonment as the
available federal sentences); Robert W. Sweet et al., Towards a Common Law of
Sentencing: Developing Judicial Precedent in Cyberspace, 65 FORDHAM L. REV. 927, 946
n.99 (1996) (listing the aspects of a sentence imposed as entailing type of sentence
(such as prison, probation, or a prison–community split), fines or restitution, and
length of imprisonment).
36.
U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, PRISONERS IN 2011,
at 1 (2012), available at http://bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/content/pub/pdf/p11.pdf.
37.
Adam Liptak, U.S. Prison Population Dwarfs That of Other Nations, N.Y.
TIMES (Apr. 23, 2008), http://www.nytimes.com/2008/04/23/world/americas/23iht23prison.12253738.html?page wanted=all&_r=0 (“The United States has less than 5
percent of the world's population. But it has almost a quarter of the world’s
prisoners.”).
38.
U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, OVERVIEW OF FEDERAL CRIMINAL CASES: FISCAL
YEAR 2011, at 3–4 (2012).
39.
Quick Facts About the Bureau of Prisons, FED. BUREAU OF PRISONS,
http://www.bop.gov/about/facts.jsp (last visited Oct. 18, 2012).
40.
See Residential Reentry Management, FED. BUREAU OF PRISONS,
http://www.bop.gov/locations/cc/index.jsp (last visited Oct. 18, 2013); Weekly Population
Report, FED. BUREAU OF PRISONS, http://www.bop.gov/locations/weekly_report.jsp#bop
(last visited Oct. 18, 2013).
41.
Residential Reentry Management, supra note 40.
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A. Prison Designation Procedures in the U.S. Federal System
1.

Statutory Framework

Federal district courts lack authority to dictate the place of
imprisonment.42 Pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3621(a), first introduced in
the Comprehensive Crime Control Act of 1984, a person sentenced to
a term of imprisonment is committed to BOP custody until the prison
term expires or until he or she is released earlier for satisfactory
behavior. 43 The BOP, under the authority of its director, may
designate any facility that meets “minimum standards of health and
habitability,”44 regardless of whether the facility is within or without
the judicial district in which the person was convicted.45
When designating a prison, the BOP may consider a variety of
factors, including: (1) the resources of a given facility; (2) the nature
and circumstances of the offense; (3) the history and characteristics of
the prisoner; (4) a statement by the court that imposed the sentence
regarding either the purposes for such imprisonment or the type of
penal or correctional facility; and (5) any pertinent policy statement
issued by the Sentencing Commission regarding application of the
guidelines or other aspects of sentencing or sentence
implementation. 46 With regard to the final factor, the Sentencing
Commission may issue a policy statement regarding how the sentence
may comply with the court’s consideration of the following factors:
(1) a reflection of the seriousness of the offense, the promotion of
respect for the law, and the provision of just punishment for the

42.
24 C.J.S. Criminal Law § 2188 (2013) (citing Mares v. Federal Bureau of
Prisons, 401 F. Supp. 2d 775 (S.D. Tex. 2005)). An individual convicted of an offense
that is statutorily punishable for less than one year may not be confined in a U.S.
penitentiary absent consent of the convicted individual. 18 U.S.C. § 4083 (2012).
43.
18 U.S.C. § 3621(a) (2012).
44.
18 U.S.C. § 3621(b) (2012); 28 C.F.R. § 0.96(c) states that
the Director of the Bureau of Prisons is authorized to exercise or perform any of
the authority, functions, or duties conferred or imposed upon the Attorney
General by any law relating to the commitment, control, or treatment of
persons . . . charged with or convicted of offenses against the United States,
including the taking of final action in . . . [d]esignating places of imprisonment
or confinement where the sentences of prisoners shall be served . . . .
28 C.F.R. § 0.96(c). The BOP may designate either a facility that it actively manages or
one that it does not. 18 U.S.C. § 3621(b) (2012).
45.
18 U.S.C. § 3621(b) (2012). The BOP also has authority to place a convicted
individual in a “shock incarceration program” when an individual is sentenced to a
term of imprisonment between 12 and 30 months. 18 U.S.C. § 4046(a) (2012).
46.
18 U.S.C. §§ 3621(b)(1)–(5) (2012); see also 28 U.S.C. § 994(a)(2) (2012)
(authorizing the Sentencing Commission to issue general policy statements regarding
sentencing). The Federal Sentencing Guidelines only reference these provisions on one
occasion, in relation to the permissibility of shock treatment. U.S. SENTENCING
GUIDELINES MANUAL § 5F1.7 (2013).
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offense; (2) the provision of adequate deterrence to criminal conduct;
(3) the protection of the public from further crimes of the defendant;
and (4) the provision to the defendant of correctional treatment such
as education, vocational training, or medical care.47 These four factors
essentially boil down to retribution, deterrence, incapacitation, and
rehabilitation, the subject of further discussion in Part V.
The designation process may be curtailed pending a convicted
individual’s appeal. As provided by Rule 38 of the Federal Rules of
Criminal Procedure, a court may recommend that the individual be
confined in close proximity to assist in preparing for the appeal.48 In
such cases, the BOP endeavors to place the individual in such a
facility.49
2.

Designation Practice of the BOP

Having reviewed the relevant statutory framework, consider the
specific BOP practice governing prison designation. After an inmate
is sentenced, the clerk of the court transmits the judgment to the U.S.
Marshals Service, which then makes a request to the Designations
and Sentence Computation Center (DSCC) in Grand Prairie, Texas.50
There, staff members engage in a process of inmate classification, the
stated objective of which is to “place each inmate in the most
appropriate facility for service of sentence.”51 Eighteen teams, each
responsible for different federal judicial districts, 52 enter into a
computer database called SENTRY information from the sentencing
court, U.S. Marshals Service, U.S. Attorneys Office or other
prosecuting authority, and the U.S. Probation Office.53 SENTRY then
generates a point score that provides an initial designation of the type
of prison by security level:

47.
See 28 U.S.C. § 994(a)(2) (2012) (authorizing the promulgation of policy
statements by the Sentencing Commission to further the purposes discussed in
18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2)(A)); 18 U.S.C. §§ 3553(a)(2)(A)–(D) (2012) (enumerating factors
courts should consider in sentencing).
48.
FED. R. CRIM. P. 38(b).
49.
BOP PROGRAM STATEMENT, supra note 11, ch. 3, at 3.
50.
Id. In old law cases, the clerk transmitted the “Judgment and Commitment
Order.” Id. ch. 3, at 1. In the past decade, the BOP has changed its designation
procedures and now processes all designations from the DSCC. Alan Ellis, Bureau of
Prisons Revamps Prison Designation Process, 22 CRIM. JUST. 60, 60 (2007); About
Grand Prairie Office Complex, FED. BUREAU OF PRISONS, http://www.bop.gov/
about/other/gra.jsp (last visited Oct. 18, 2013); BOP PROGRAM STATEMENT, supra note
11, ch. 1, at 2.
51.
BOP PROGRAM STATEMENT, supra note 11, ch. 3, at 3.
52.
Ellis, supra note 50, at 60.
53.
BOP PROGRAM STATEMENT, supra note 11, ch. 1, at 2.
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Points
0–11 (male)
0–15 (female)
12–15 (male)
16–30 (female)
16–23 (male)
N/A (female)57
24+ (male)
31+ (female)
All point totals

[vol. 46:1267

Security Level
Minimum

Custody Level
“Community”54 and “Out”55

Low

“Out” and “In”56

Medium

“Out” and “In”

High

“In” and “Maximum”58

Administrative

All levels of custody

This score provides the base-line level of security necessary at the
designated prison. The DSCC may then vary the base line by
applying a “pre-sentence factor” (PSF) or “management variable”
(MGTV).59 A PSF is relevant information that necessitates additional
security measures for the safety and protection of the public.60 For
example, sex offenders, deportable aliens, and individuals deemed a
threat to government officials must be confined in a low security level
institution at the minimum. 61 An inmate is assigned up to three
PSFs. 62 MGTVs are factors that were not part of the initial
assessment of security level and include judicial recommendations

54.
“Community custody” is the lowest level of custody. Id. ch. 2, at 1. An
inmate in such custody “may be eligible for the least secure housing, including any
which is outside the institution’s perimeter, may work on outside details with minimal
supervision, and may participate in community-based program activities if other
eligibility requirements are satisfied.” Id.
55.
“Out custody” is the second lowest level of custody. Id. ch. 2, at 4. An
inmate in such custody “may be assigned to less secure housing and may be eligible for
work details outside the institution's secure perimeter with a minimum of two-hour
intermittent staff supervision.” Id.
56.
“In custody” is the second highest level of custody. Id. ch. 2, at 2. An inmate
in such custody “is assigned to regular quarters and is eligible for all regular work
assignments and activities under a normal level of supervision,” though the inmate
does not qualify for work or other activities outsides of the secure perimeter of the
facility. Id.
57.
Female security level institutions are only classified as Minimum, Low,
High, and Administrative. Id. ch. 1, at 3.
58.
“Maximum custody” is the highest level of custody. Id. ch. 2, at 3. An
inmate in such custody “requires ultimate control and supervision” as the individual
has been “identified as assaultive, predacious, riotous, [a] serious escape risk[ ], or
seriously disruptive to the orderly running of an institution.” Id. Such individuals are
thus given quarters and work assignments “to ensure maximum control and
supervision.” Id.
59.
Id. ch. 1, at 2.
60.
Id. ch. 5, at 7.
61.
Id. ch. 5, at 7–13.
62.
Id. ch. 5, at 4.
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regarding specific institutions for designation, release residence, 63
medical or psychiatric considerations,64 or length of sentence.65 For
example, old age may be an MGTV that in turn affects an inmate’s
placement.66
At the conclusion of this process, the DSCC staff forwards all
relevant documentation to the designated institution within two
working days. 67 Transfer of the convicted individual then occurs
under the oversight of the U.S. Marshals Service.68
B. Analysis: The U.S. Prison Designation Paradigm
What emerges from this review of U.S federal designation
procedures? The U.S. prison designation paradigm exhibits the
following essential features, each key to grasping the importance of
prison location:
First, a federal district court renders a conviction and sentence.
An individual’s sentence to a term of imprisonment is a condition
precedent to the initiation of the U.S. prison designation process. This
“trigger” may be short-circuited by detention pending appeal
pursuant to Rule 38 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure.
Second, the relevant sentencing materials are given to the
nonjudicial BOP. While the power to decide the length and nature of
a defendant’s sentence rests exclusively in the hands of federal judges
and juries, the power to place an individual in a penal or correctional
facility rests exclusively with the BOP, a federal agency under the
authority of the DOJ.
Third, the BOP designates a prison facility based on minimum
guarantees and discretionary factors. Though the BOP has broad
authority to designate a place of imprisonment that meets the
“minimum standards of health and habitability,” federal procedures
include other discretionary factors. Relevant considerations include
resources at a facility, 69 the nature and circumstances of the
offense, 70 the history and characteristics of the prisoner, 71 a
statement by the sentencing court about the purposes of

63.
The BOP endeavors to designate prison facilities “reasonabl[y] close” to the
anticipated release area, usually within five hundred miles. Id. ch. 5, at 3.
64.
Id. “An inmate who has a history of or is presently exhibiting psychiatric
problems may need an initial designation to a psychiatric referral center.” Id.
65.
Id. ch. 5, at 5–6.
66.
Id. ch. 5, at 5.
67.
Id. ch. 3, at 5.
68.
Prisoner Operations, U.S. MARSHALS SERV., http://www.usmarshals.gov/
duties/prisoner.htm (last visited Oct. 18, 2013).
69.
18 U.S.C. § 3621(b)(1) (2012).
70.
18 U.S.C. § 3621(b)(2) (2012).
71.
18 U.S.C. § 3621(b)(3) (2012).
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imprisonment or the type of penal or correctional facility, 72 a
statement issued by an institution such as a Sentencing Commission
regarding application of the guidelines or any other aspect of sentence
implementation, 73 just deserts, 74 deterrence, 75 incapacitation, 76 and
rehabilitation.77 Upon consideration of such factors, the designating
institution then designates a particular facility.
Fourth and finally, the convicted individual is transferred to the
designated facility. Transfer occurs under the oversight of the U.S.
Marshals Service.
Having argued for these four essential features of the U.S. prison
designation paradigm, the following Part will make similar
contentions regarding the analogous international procedures.
III. THE INTERNATIONAL PRISON DESIGNATION PARADIGM
International enforcement of sentences structurally differs from
the U.S. model.78 In contrast to U.S. federal courts—which rely on a
federal prison system to carry out the judicially imposed sentence—
international courts lack comparable affiliated institutions to enforce
criminal sentences and thus rely on the international community for
such enforcement.79 Therefore, while prison location matters at both

72.
18 U.S.C. § 3621(b)(4) (2012).
73.
18 U.S.C. § 3621(b)(5) (2012).
74.
See id. (allowing the BOP to consider policy statements issued by the
Sentencing Commission under 28 U.S.C. § 994(a)(2)); 28 U.S.C. § 994(a)(2) (2012)
(requiring the promulgation of policy statements by the Sentencing Commission to
further the purposes discussed in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2)(A)); 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2)(A)
(2012) (citing the need for a sentence “to provide just punishment for the offense” as a
factor to be considered when imposing a sentence).
75.
See 18 U.S.C. § 3621(b)(5) (2012); 28 U.S.C. § 994(a)(2) (2012); 18 U.S.C.
§ 3553(a)(2)(B) (2012) (citing the need to consider deterrence when imposing a
sentence).
76.
See 18 U.S.C. § 3621(b)(5) (2012); 28 U.S.C. § 994(a)(2) (2012); 18 U.S.C.
§ 3553(a)(2)(C) (2012) (citing the need for a sentence “to protect the public from further
crimes of the defendant” as a factor to be considered when imposing a sentence).
77.
See 18 U.S.C. § 3621(b)(5) (2012); 28 U.S.C. § 994(a)(2) (2012); 18 U.S.C.
§ 3553(a)(2)(D) (2012) (citing the need for a sentence “to provide the defendant with
needed educational or vocational training, medical care, or other correctional treatment
in the most effective manner” as a factor to be considered when imposing a sentence).
78.
As a preliminary matter, this Article will only address the enforcement
procedures of the ICC, ICTY, and ICTR in the name of concision. This is also due to the
realities of international criminal practice at present, as the vast majority of
international criminals have been incarcerated by the ICTY and ICTR. The ICC has
also been included because, as the permanent international criminal institution, it will
provide the foundation for international criminal enforcement of sentences for decades
to come.
79.
This is one of the myriad distinctions between U.S. and international
criminal sentencing. For example, whereas the U.S. federal courts have advisory
sentencing guidelines that further the basic purposes of criminal sentencing, the Rome
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domestic and international levels, differences between the two
systems are reflected in the work of three international criminal
tribunals: the ICC, the ICTY, and the ICTR.
Taken together, the essence of these tribunals’ prison
designation procedures can be distilled into an international prison
designation paradigm that has the following features: (1) an appellate
chamber’s judgment of conviction and sentence, (2) the transfer of
relevant sentencing materials to another organ of the tribunal, (3) the
tribunals’ designation of a State of enforcement based on minimum
guarantees and discretionary factors, and (4) the convicted
individual’s transfer to the designated State of enforcement.
A. The International Criminal Tribunals: A Brief Overview
The international criminal tribunals are heirs to the legacy of
the Nuremburg and Tokyo Tribunals, which prosecuted war criminals
in the wake of World War II.80 These modern tribunals target “the
most serious crimes of concern to the international community” and
aspire to end impunity for those criminally responsible for mass
atrocities.81

Statute “has virtually nothing to say about the purposes of sentencing” and has yet to
articulate any such purposes in a sentencing decision because no such decision has yet
been issued by an ICC chamber. WILLIAM A. SCHABAS, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE
INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT 163 (2d ed. 2004); United States v. Booker, 543 U.S.
220, 222, 245 (2005) (holding that the mandatory nature of the federal sentencing
guidelines violated the Sixth Amendment right to a jury trial and that the guidelines
were advisory); U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL ch.
1, pt. A, subsec. 2 (2011) (“The Sentencing Reform Act of 1984 (Title II of the
Comprehensive Crime Control Act of 1984) provides for the development of guidelines
that will further the basic purposes of criminal punishment: deterrence, incapacitation,
just punishment, and rehabilitation.”). The ICTY and ICTR statutes likewise fail to
enumerate either the criteria that should guide sentencing or any objective of
punishment, though the Security Council made various broad references to retribution
and deterrence during the time of Security Council Resolution 827. See D’ASCOLI,
supra note 27, at 135–40 (noting that, in light of references to retribution and
deterrence, judges have assumed these purposes could be taken into account for
sentencing). Note, Laser Beam or Blunderbuss?: Evaluating the Usefulness of
Determinate Sentencing for Military Commissions and International Criminal Law,
120 HARV. L. REV. 1848, 1860 (2007) (noting that the ICTY and ICTR, for their parts,
“have never espoused a single, coherent set of sentencing principles, in either their
governing statutes or their case law”).
80.
See Theodor Meron, Reflections on the Prosecution of War Crimes by
International Tribunals, 100 AM. J. INT’L L. 551, 552 (2006), available at
http://www.asil.org/files/4091370.pdf (noting that the successes in Nuremberg and
Tokyo enabled the international community to establish modern international criminal
tribunals).
81.
Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court pmbl., July 17, 1998,
2187 U.N.T.S. 3 (entered into force July 1, 2002) [hereinafter Rome Statute]; see also
D’ASCOLI, supra note 27, at 1 (“International justice deals with the most heinous and
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The ICC is a permanent institution, established by multilateral
treaty, with “power to exercise its jurisdiction over persons for the
most serious crimes of international concern” that is “complementary
to national criminal jurisdictions.”82 This definition distinguishes the
ICC from the ICTY and ICTR in several ways: (1) it is permanent, in
contrast to the short-term lifespans of the ad hoc tribunals;83 (2) it
has jurisdiction over multiple regions, as opposed to the specific
territorial jurisdictions of the ad hoc tribunals; 84 and (3) it has
supplementary jurisdiction over matters that States are “unable or
unwilling” to prosecute, in contrast to the concurrent but primary
jurisdiction of the ad hoc tribunals. 85 The ICC currently has the

serious criminal offences and one of its objectives is to achieve individual accountability
for those atrocities.”).
82.
Rome Statute, supra note 81, at art. 1.
83.
S.C. Res. 1966, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1966, at 1–2 (Dec. 22, 2010) (noting the ad
hoc nature of the tribunals and thus the need to establish the MICT to take over any
residual functions once the ICTY and ICTR have ceased to exist); The Mechanism for
International Criminal Tribunals, INT’L CRIM. TRIB. FOR THE FORMER YUGOSLAVIA,
http://www.icty.org/sid/10874 (last visited Oct. 18, 2013) (reviewing the functions of the
MICT after the ICTY and ICTR have completed their respective mandates).
84.
Compare Updated Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for the
Former Yugoslavia art. 9, Sept. 2009 [hereinafter ICTY Statute], available at
http://www.icty.org/ x/file/Legal %20Library/Statute/statute_sept09_en.pdf which
states that
the International Tribunal and national courts shall have concurrent
jurisdiction to prosecute persons for serious violations of international
humanitarian law committed in the territory of the former Yugoslavia since 1
January 1991. . . . The International Tribunal shall have primacy over national
courts. At any stage of the procedure, the International Tribunal may formally
request national courts to defer to the competence of the International Tribunal
in accordance with the present Statute and the Rules of Procedure and
Evidence of the International Tribunal.
with Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda art. 8, Nov. 8, 1994
[hereinafter ICTR Statute], available at http://www.unictr.org/Portals/0/English/Legal/
Statute/ 2010.pdf which states that
the International Tribunal for Rwanda and national courts shall have
concurrent jurisdiction to prosecute persons for serious violations of
international humanitarian law committed in the territory of Rwanda and
Rwandan citizens for such violations committed in the territory of the
neighbouring States, between 1 January 1994 and 31 December 1994. . . . The
International Tribunal for Rwanda shall have the primacy over the national
courts of all States. At any stage of the procedure, the International Tribunal
for Rwanda may formally request national courts to defer to its competence in
accordance with the present Statute and the Rules of Procedure and Evidence
of the International Tribunal for Rwanda.
85.
Compare ICTY Statute, supra note 84, at art. 8 (“The territorial jurisdiction
of the International Tribunal shall extend to the territory of the former Socialist
Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, including its land surface, airspace and territorial
waters.”), with ICTR Statute, supra note 84, at art. 7 (“The territorial jurisdiction of
the International Tribunal for Rwanda shall extend to the territory of Rwanda
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power to prosecute individuals for genocide, crimes against humanity,
and war crimes.86 To date, twenty cases have been brought before the
court, resulting in one conviction and sentence rendered thus far,
with a sentencing appeal judgment pending.87
The United Nations Security Council (the Security Council)
created the ICTY in 1993 pursuant to its authority under Chapter VII
of the United Nations Charter. 88 It was established “for the sole
purpose of prosecuting persons responsible for serious violations of
international humanitarian law committed in the territory of the
former Yugoslavia after 1 January 1991.”89 The ICTY has the power
to prosecute individuals for grave breaches of the Geneva
Conventions of 1949, violations of the laws or customs of war,
genocide, and crimes against humanity. 90 To date, the ICTY has
indicted 161 individuals, with ongoing proceedings against 25
individuals and proceedings concluded against 136. 91 Of the latter
group, 69 individuals have been sentenced to imprisonment.92
The Security Council created the ICTR in 1994, again pursuant
to its Chapter VII authority.93 This tribunal was established “for the
sole purpose of prosecuting persons responsible for genocide and other
serious violations of international humanitarian law committed in the
territory of Rwanda and Rwandan citizens responsible for genocide
and other such violations committed in the territory of neighbouring
States, between 1 January 1994 and 31 December 1994.”94 The ICTR
has the power to prosecute individuals for genocide, crimes against
humanity, and violations of Article 3 Common to the Geneva
Conventions and of Additional Protocol II.95 To date, the ICTR has
indicted ninety-nine individuals, with ongoing proceedings against

including its land surface and airspace as well as to the territory of neighbouring
States in respect of serious violations of international humanitarian law committed by
Rwandan citizens.”).
86.
Rome Statute, supra note 81, at arts. 6–8. Beginning in January 2017, the
ICC will also have the power to prosecute individuals for the crime of aggression.
International Criminal Court Review Conference, Crime of Aggression, RC/Res.6,
Annex I, §§ 3–4 (June 11, 2010), available at http://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/asp_docs/
Resolutions/RC-Res.6-ENG.pdf.
87.
Situations and Cases, INT’L CRIM. CT., http://www.icc-cpi.int/en_menus/
icc/situations%20and%20cases/Pages/situations%20and%20cases.aspx (last visited Oct.
18, 2013).
88.
See generally S.C. Res. 827, U.N. SCOR, 3217th Mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/827
(May 25, 1993).
89.
Id. at 2.
90.
ICTY Statute, supra note 84, at arts. 2–5.
91.
Key Figures of the Cases, supra note 27.
92.
Id.
93.
See generally S.C. Res. 955, U.N. SCOR, 49th Sess., 3453d Mtg., U.N. Doc.
S/RES/955 (Nov. 8, 1994).
94.
Id. at 2.
95.
ICTR Statute, supra note 84, at arts. 2–4.
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sixteen individuals, nine individuals still at large, and proceedings
concluded against seventy-five individuals. 96 Of the latter group,
fifty-two individuals have been sentenced to imprisonment.97
B. Prison Designation Procedures of the ICC, ICTY, and ICTR
1.

Sentencing Designation Procedures of the ICC

Indictees of the ICC are held in a converted Dutch prison in
Scheveningen, a coastal town just north of The Hague.98 Though all
indictees are detained within the same overall prison complex and
some facilities are shared, the indictees of the tribunals are separated
from one another. Thus, these facilities may be called by different
names depending on the tribunal itself; the ICC Detention Center is
allotted for ICC indictees. 99 There, as individuals remanded in
custody, they are detained during pretrial, trial, and appellate
proceedings.100
At first blush, the most logical place for ICC convicts to serve
their sentences would be in the Netherlands itself. After all, the court
sits in the same place as the ICC Detention Center, and such an
arrangement seems analogous to that of the United States. 101
However, pursuant to prior agreements with the Netherlands,
individuals may not remain in the United Nations Detention Unit
(UNDU) after they have been sentenced to a term of imprisonment.
The Headquarters Agreement between the International Criminal
Court and the Host State 102 (Headquarters Agreement) elucidates
this procedure. 103 Pursuant to Article 49(1) of the Headquarters
Agreement, the ICC must first “endeavour to designate a State of
enforcement” pursuant to Article 103(1) of the Rome Statute of the

96.
Status of Cases, INT’L CRIM. TRIB. FOR RWANDA, supra note 22.
97.
Id.
98.
See also Mary Margaret Penrose, No Badges, No Bars: A Conspicuous
Oversight in the Development of an International Criminal Court, 38 TEX. INT’L L.J.
621, 639 (2003) (“Currently, the ICTY Detention Unit in Scheveningen, the North Sea
Port on the outskirts of The Hague holds forty-three individuals either awaiting trial
before or awaiting transfer from the ICTY.”) (footnotes omitted).
99.
See The ICC Detention Centre, INT’L CRIM. CT., http://www.icccpi.int/en_menus/icc/structure%20of%20the%20court/detention/Pages/detention.aspxht
tp://www.icc-cpi.int/en_menus/icc/structure%20of%20the%20court/detention/Pages/
detention.aspx (last visited Oct. 18, 2013).
100.
Id.
101.
See Penrose, supra note 98, at 639 (noting that where no willing state
accepts a prisoner, he or she will be housed in The Hague).
102.
The “host State” is the Netherlands.
103.
See Headquarters Agreement between the International Criminal Court
and the Host State, I.C.C.-Neth., art. 49(1), Mar. 1, 2008, ICC-BD/04-01-08.
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International Criminal Court (Rome Statute).104 If the ICC does not
designate a State of enforcement, however, the ICC must inform the
host State about the need for the host State to provide a prison
facility for purposes of enforcement.105 The sentence of imprisonment
will then be served in a prison facility in the host State, with the costs
of imprisonment being paid by the court.106
So if ICC convicts generally may not serve their sentences in the
Netherlands, where may they serve their sentences? The answer lies
in a nuanced system of “double consent” in which a State must both
be placed on a list of States amenable to enforcing sentences—the
“list phase”—and then subsequently accept a convicted person for the
purposes of a specific sentence—the “designation phase.”107
During the list phase, an individual State that has ratified the
Rome Statute declares its willingness to accept sentenced persons,
subject to any conditions that it may attach and has resolved with the
ICC Presidency.108 The reality of this approach is that the ICC enters
into bilateral agreements with States in order to establish the
practice and procedures by which a sentence may be enforced. 109
These agreements are ably negotiated by the Enforcement Unit of the
ICC Presidency, based on a model enforcement agreement that is
culled from relevant provisions of the Rome Statute and the Rules of
Procedure and Evidence and supplemented by the practice of the ad
hoc international criminal tribunals. 110 As of the time of writing,

104.
Id. at art. 49(1). As discussed further below, Article 103(1) provides that
each prison sentence is served in a State that the court designates from a list of States
that previously indicated a willingness to accept sentenced individuals. Rome Statute,
supra note 81, at art. 103(1).
105.
See Penrose, supra note 98, at 639 (“Currently, and only by default, all
persons condemned by the ICC are assured that if no willing state proffers space in
conformity with the Rome Statute, they will be housed at the seat of the ICC in The
Hague.”).
106.
Rome Statute, supra note 81, at art. 103(4). Pursuant to both Article 106 of
the Rome Statute and Article 49(4) of the Headquarters Agreement, the enforcement of
the sentence is to be governed by the Rome Statute (provisions in Part 10) and the
Rules of Procedure and Evidence (provisions of Chapter 12), while the conditions of
imprisonment are to be governed by the Rome Statute (Article 6(2) of the Rome
Statute). The host State would then communicate any humanitarian or other concerns
to the court, while any other arrangements would be set out in a separate agreement
between the court and the host State.
107.
Claus Kress & Göran Sluiter, Preliminary Remarks, in 2 THE ROME
STATUTE OF THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT: A COMMENTARY 1751, 1787
(Antonio Cassese et al. eds., 2002); Abtahi & Koh, supra note 12, at 6.
108.
Rome Statute, supra note 81, at art. 103(1)(b); INT’L CRIM. CT. R. P. & EVID.
200(2) (2002); Abtahi & Koh, supra note 12, at 7.
109.
Abtahi & Koh, supra note 12, at 7.
110.
See Gerard A.M. Strijards, Article 103: Role of States in Enforcement of
Sentences of Imprisonment, in COMMENTARY ON THE ROME STATUTE OF THE
INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT: OBSERVERS’ NOTES, ARTICLE BY ARTICLE, supra note
17, at 1647, 1653; Abtahi & Koh, supra note 12, at 7.
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enforcement agreements exist with Belgium, Colombia, Denmark,
Finland, Mali, Serbia, and the United Kingdom.111
During the designation phase, after the chamber has sentenced a
convicted person, the Presidency goes about the task of designating a
specific State of enforcement. 112 In making this decision, the
Presidency shall consider relevant factors such as equitable
distribution—including equitable geographical distribution and the
number of persons already serving sentences in that State—widely
accepted international treaty standards governing the treatment of
prisoners, the views and nationality of the sentenced person, and
other relevant information pertaining to the particular circumstances
of the crime, the person sentenced, or the effective enforcement of the
sentence. 113 If the State accepts the designation, the process of
enforcing the sentence begins pursuant to the bilateral enforcement
agreement previously negotiated. If the State declines, the Presidency
may designate another State.114 As mentioned above, should no State
accept designation, enforcement procedures will commence pursuant
to the Headquarters Agreement.115

111.
See Official Journal of the International Criminal Court, INT’L CRIM. CT.,
http://www.icc-cpi.int/en_menus/icc/legal%20texts%20and%20tools/official%20journal/
Pages/index.aspx (last visited Oct. 18, 2013) (containing agreements with Austria,
Belgium, Finland, Mali, Serbia, and the United Kingdom); see also The ICC Signs
Enforcement Agreements with Belgium, Denmark, and Finland, INT’L CRIM. CT. (June 1,
2010),
http://www.icc-cpi.int/en_menus/icc/press%20and%20media/press%20releases/
press%20releases%20(2010)/Pages/pr533.aspx (announcing the signing ceremony for
agreements with Belgium, Denmark, and Finland); ICC President to Sign Enforcement
of Sentences Agreement During His Visit to Colombia, INT’L CRIM. CT. (May 16, 2011),
http://www.icc-cpi.int/en_menus/icc/press%20and%20media/press%20releases/press%
20releases%20(2011)/Pages/icc%20president%20to%20sign%20enforcement%20of%20s
entences%20agreement%20during%20his%20visit%20to%20colombia.aspx (discussing
Colombia’s agreement to enforce ICC sentences); Abtahi & Koh, supra note 12, at 8.
Due to ratification procedures within Colombia and Denmark, these two enforcement
agreements have not yet come into force. Id. at 8 n.39.
112.
Rome Statute, supra note 81, at art. 103.
113.
Id. at art. 103(3) (“In exercising its discretion to make a designation under
paragraph 1, the Court shall take into account . . . [t]he principle that States Parties
should share the responsibility for enforcing sentences of imprisonment, in accordance
with principles of equitable distribution, as provided in the Rules of Procedure and
Evidence . . . .”); INT’L CRIM. CT. R. P. & EVID. 201 (“Principles of equitable distribution
for purposes of article 103, paragraph 3, shall include . . . [t]he principle of equitable
geographical distribution; . . . [t]he need to afford each State on the list an opportunity
to receive sentenced persons; . . . [t]he number of sentenced persons already received by
that State and other States of enforcement . . . .”); id. at 203 (“The Presidency shall give
notice in writing to the sentenced person that it is addressing the designation of a State
of enforcement. The sentenced person shall, within such time limit as the Presidency
shall prescribe, submit in writing his or her views on the question to the Presidency.”);
Abtahi & Koh, supra note 12, at 9.
114.
INT’L CRIM. CT. R. P. & EVID. 205.
115.
Rome Statute, supra note 81, at art. 103(4) (“If no State is designated under
paragraph 1, the sentence of imprisonment shall be served in a prison facility made
available by the host State, in accordance with the conditions set out in the
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Finally, as noted above, there has been little enforcement
practice at the ICC beyond the conclusion of enforcement agreements,
though the court will likely make its first designation this year if the
conviction and sentence of Thomas Lubanga is affirmed on appeal.
2.

Sentencing Designation Procedures of the ICTY

Indictees of the ICTY are held in the same converted Dutch
prison in The Hague suburb of Scheveningen, though such facilities
are referred to as the UNDU.116 There, as individuals remanded in
custody, ICTY indictees are detained during pretrial, trial, and
appellate proceedings.117 The UNDU also holds prisoners convicted of
contempt or perjury and individuals whose convictions have been
affirmed on appeal and are thus awaiting transfer to a prison facility
outside of the Netherlands. 118 Facilities include sleeping quarters,
offices for self-represented indictees, recreational rooms, and eating
spaces.119 Similar to the ICC, the ICTY Headquarters Agreement has
been interpreted by the government of the Netherlands as precluding
the enforcement of sentences within Dutch prison facilities.120
Thus, the ICTY also undergoes a list phase, in which it concludes
bilateral enforcement agreements with individual States that have
shown a willingness to enforce sentences against convicted
individuals. 121 This negotiation occurs on the basis of a model
enforcement agreement. 122 Then, once a convicted individual has
completed his or her appeal and time remains to be served on his or
her sentence of imprisonment, the tribunal must enter its own
designation phase. Article 27 of the ICTY Statute states generally:
Imprisonment shall be served in a State designated by the
International Tribunal from a list of States which have indicated to the
Security Council their willingness to accept convicted persons. Such
imprisonment shall be in accordance with the applicable law of the

headquarters agreement . . . . In such a case, the costs arising out of the enforcement of
a sentence of imprisonment shall be borne by the Court.”).
116.
Detention, INT’L CRIM. TRIB. FOR THE FORMER YUGOSLAVIA,
http://www.icty.org/sections/AbouttheICTY/Detention (last visited Oct. 18, 2013).
Author Visit to the UNDU (May 5, 2012).
117.
See Detention, supra note 116. The ICTY has developed a somewhat robust
regime of rules governing detention at the UNDU. See generally Rules Governing the
Detention of Persons Awaiting Trial or Appeal Before the Tribunal or Otherwise
Detained on the Authority of the Tribunal, May 5, 1994, U.N. Doc. IT38/Rev. 9
(amended July 21, 2005).
118.
van Zyl Smit, supra note 12, at 367.
119.
See Detention, supra note 116; Author visit to the UNDU (May 5, 2012).
120.
Author meeting with member of ICTY Registry (Jan. 10, 2013).
121.
Tolbert & Rydberg, supra note 12, at 533–35.
122.
Id. at 540–41.
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State concerned, subject to the supervision of the International
Tribunal.123

The UN secretary-general, and subsequently the Security Council,
have conclusively interpreted Article 27 as precluding enforcement of
sentences within the territory of the former Yugoslavia.124
The ad hoc tribunals’ “[c]hambers have always been silent as to
the countries where sentences may be carried out.” 125 Indeed, the
ICTY’s registrar126 makes a preliminary inquiry of States that have
indicated a willingness to accept convicted persons and signed a
related agreement with the tribunal.127 At this stage, the registrar
provides any documents of relevance, including a copy of the
judgment and a statement regarding how much of the sentence the
individual served in pretrial detention or otherwise. 128 In deciding
which government to approach, the registrar considers the equitable

123.
ICTY Statute, supra note 84, at art. 27.
124.
See U.N. Secretary-General, Report of the Secretary General Pursuant to
Paragraph 2 of Security Council Resolution 808, ¶ 121, U.N. Doc. S/25704 (May 3,
1993) (“The Secretary-General is of the view that, given the nature of the crimes in
question and the international character of the tribunal, the enforcement of sentences
should take place outside the territory of the former Yugoslavia.”). Rule 103 of the
Rules of Procedure and Evidence for the ICTY states:
(A) Imprisonment shall be served in a State designated by the President of the
Tribunal from a list of States which have indicated their willingness to accept
convicted persons. (B) Transfer of the convicted person to that State shall be
effected as soon as possible after the time-limit for appeal has elapsed. (C)
Pending the finalisation of arrangements for his or her transfer to the State
where his or her sentence will be served, the convicted person shall remain in
the custody of the Tribunal.
INT’L CRIM. TRIB. FOR THE FORMER YUGOSLAVIA, R. P. & EVID. 103, U.N. Doc.
IT/32/Rev.49 (May 22, 2013), at 106.
125.
Weinberg de Roca & Rassi, supra note 12, at 42.
126.
The ICC, ICTY, and ICTR each have a “Registrar” who oversees the
Registry organ of the tribunal and thus all nonjudicial activities of the court or
tribunal. Office of the Registrar, COALITION FOR THE INT’L CRIM. CT.,
http://www.iccnow.org/?mod=registrar (last visited Oct. 18, 2013) [hereinafter Office of
the Registrar, ICC]; Structure of the Court, INT’L CRIM. CT., http://www.icccpi.int/en_menus/icc/structure%20of%20the%20court/Pages/structure%20of%20the%
20court.aspx (last visited Oct. 18, 2013) [hereinafter Structure of the Court, ICC]; The
Registry, INT’L CRIM. TRIB. FOR RWANDA, http://www.unictr.org/AboutICTR/
ICTRStructure/TheRegistry/tabid/105/Default.aspx (last visited Oct. 18, 2013)
[hereinafter The Registry, ICTR]; The Registrar, INT’L CRIM. TRIB. FOR THE FORMER
YUGOSLAVIA, http://www.icty.org/sid/168 (last visited Oct. 18, 2013) [hereinafter The
Registrar, ICTY]; Registry, INT’L CRIM. TRIB. FOR THE FORMER YUGOSLAVIA,
http://www.icty.org/sections/AbouttheICTY/Registry (last visited Oct. 18, 2013)
[hereinafter Registry, ICTY].
127.
Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia, Practice Direction on the
Procedure for Designation of the State in which a Convicted Person is to Serve his/her
Sentence of Imprisonment, ¶ 2, IT/137/Rev. 1 (Sept. 1, 2009), available at
http://www.icty.org/x/file/ Legal%20Library/Practice_Directions/it_137_rev1_en.pdf.
128.
Id.
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distribution of convicted persons among all the States and the ability
of the State to enforce the particular sentence, such as its national
laws relating to the pardon or commutation of a sentence.129 After
this point, the registrar prepares a confidential memorandum to the
ICTY president, indicating the State that has indicated its
willingness to enforce the sentence.130 The registrar may also provide
other information to the president, including: (1) the convicted
person’s marital status or other relevant familial considerations;
(2) whether the person is expected to serve as a witness in any future
ICTY proceedings; (3) any medical or psychological reports on the
convicted person; (4) the linguistic skills of the convicted person; and
(5) the State’s laws regarding pardon and commutation of
sentences. 131 The ICTY president will then, on the basis of the
submitted information and any other inquiries, decide whether the
convicted person will serve his sentence in the State named in the
confidential memorandum. 132 Should the president determine that
the suggested State is inappropriate, he or she will instruct the
registrar to approach another State. 133 The president may consult
with the Sentencing Chamber, its presiding judge, the convicted
individual, or the Office of the Prosecutor when making the
determination.134
In practice, sixteen countries have signed agreements on
enforcement of ICTY sentences.135 The countries that are enforcing or
have enforced ICTY sentences—as well as the number of sentences
that they have enforced—are: Austria (6), Belgium (1), Denmark (4),
Estonia (2), Finland (5), France (4), Germany (4), Italy (5), Norway
(5), Portugal (1), Spain (5), Sweden (3), and the United Kingdom
(3).136

129.
Id. ¶ 3.
130.
Id. ¶ 4.
131.
Id.
132.
Id. ¶ 5.
133.
Id.
134.
Id.
135.
The countries and dates of ratification are: Albania (Sept. 19, 2008),
Belgium (May 2, 2007), Austria (July 23, 1999), Poland (Sept. 18, 2008), the United
Kingdom (Mar. 11, 2004), Norway (Apr. 24, 1998), Slovakia (Apr. 7, 2008), Denmark
(June 4, 2002), Finland (May 7, 1997), Estonia (Feb. 11, 2008), Spain (Mar. 28, 2000),
Italy (Feb. 6, 1997), Portugal (Dec. 19, 2007), France (Feb. 25, 2000), Ukraine (Aug. 7,
2007), Sweden (Feb. 23, 1999). Member States Cooperation, INT’L CRIM. TRIB. FOR THE
FORMER YUGOSLAVIA, http://www.icty.org/sid/137#sentences (last visited Oct. 18, 2013).
136.
Enforcement of Sentences, MECHANISM FOR INT’L CRIM. TRIBS.,
http://unmict.org/enforcement-of-sentences.html (last visited Oct. 18, 2013).
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Sentencing Designation Procedures of the ICTR

Individuals in detention on remand are held in the United
Nations Detention Facility (UNDF) in Arusha, Tanzania, which is
situated on the premises of a local Tanzanian prison. 137 Like the
ICTY’s UNDU, the UNDF also holds prisoners found guilty of
contempt or perjury, as well as convicts whose appeals have
completed and who are awaiting transfer to another prison facility.138
It contains eighty-nine individual cells, as well as a kitchen, medical
facilities, a classroom, and a gymnasium.139 Furthermore, similar to
the arrangement with the ICC and ICTY, Tanzania has stated that it
will not serve ICTR sentences unless it indicates its willingness to the
Security Council.140
Article 26 of the statute of the ICTR, however, provides:
Imprisonment shall be served in Rwanda or any of the States on a list
of States which have indicated to the Security Council their willingness
to accept convicted persons, as designated by the International
Tribunal for Rwanda. Such imprisonment shall be in accordance with
the applicable law of the State concerned, subject to the supervision of
the International Tribunal for Rwanda.141

Pursuant to this article, the ICTR first negotiates a series of bilateral
enforcement agreements highly similar to those of the ICC and
ICTY.142 After an ICTR chamber sentences an individual, appellate
proceedings have concluded, and time remains to be served on the
sentence, 143 the registrar engages in communications with States
that have declared their willingness to accept convicted persons and

137.
Adama Dieng, Capacity-Building Efforts of the ICTR: A Different Kind of
Legacy, 9 NW. J. INT’L HUM. RTS. 403, 413 (2011); Penrose, supra note 98, at 639.
138.
van Zyl Smit, supra note 12, at 367 n.13 (2005). Like the ICTY, the ICTR also
operates pursuant to rules of detention. Int’l Crim. Trib. for Rwanda, Rules Covering the
Detention of Persons Awaiting Trial or Appeal Before the Tribunal or Otherwise Detained
on the Authority of the Tribunal (June 5, 1998), available at http://www.unictr.org/
Portals/0/English/Legal/Defence%20Counsel/English/detention_07.pdf.
139.
See Detention of Suspects and Imprisonment of Convicted Persons [in] The
Detention Facility, INT’L CRIM. TRIB. FOR RWANDA, http://www.unictr.org/
AboutICTR/FactSheets/DetentionofSuspectsandConvictedPersons/tabid/114/Default.as
px (last visited Oct. 18, 2013).
140.
See President of the Int’l Crim. Trib. for Rwanda, First Annual Report of
the International Criminal Tribunal for the Prosecution of Persons Responsible for
Genocide and Other Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law Committed
in the Territory of Rwanda and Rwandan Citizens Responsible for Genocide and Other
Such Violations Committed in the Territory of Neighbouring States Between 1 January
and 31 December 1994, attach. I, U.N. Doc. A/51/399-S/1996/778 (Sept. 24, 1996).
141.
ICTR Statute, supra note 84, at art. 26.
142.
Id.
143.
See INT’L CRIM. TRIB. FOR RWANDA R. P. & EVID. 103(b) (1995) (“Transfer of the
convicted person to that State shall be effected as soon as possible after the time limit for
appeal has elapsed.”).
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have signed an agreement with the ICTR.144 The registrar requests
that the States provide an indication of their readiness to receive a
convict. 145 Upon receipt of this response, the registrar gives the
following information to the State: (1) a certified copy of the
judgment; (2) a statement indicating how much of the sentence the
individual has already served; (3) any medical or psychological
reports regarding the convicted person, any recommendations
regarding treatment for the person, and other information relevant to
the enforcement of the sentence; and (4) certified copies of the
identification papers of the convicted person.146
On the basis of such communications, the registrar then
prepares a confidential memorandum to the president of the tribunal,
enumerating the States which may enforce the sentence. 147 The
memorandum will also include information about: (1) the marital
status, dependents, and other family relations of the convicted person
and usual place(s) of residence of such individuals, as well as their
financial resources; (2) whether the individual may serve as a witness
in future ICTR proceedings; (3) whether the person is expected to be
relocated as a witness and which State(s) have entered into relocation
agreements with the tribunal; (4) any relevant medical or
psychological reports; (5) linguistic skills of the convicted person; and
(6) the “general conditions of imprisonment and rules governing
security and liberty” in the State(s); and (7) any other
considerations. 148 On the basis of this and other inquiries the
president makes, the president will designate a particular country as
the State of enforcement and request that the government of that
State enforce the sentence. 149 If the government declines, the
president will designate another State on the basis of the information
already received from the registrar.150
The ICTR has concluded enforcement agreements with the
governments of Benin, France, Italy, Mali, Rwanda, Swaziland, and

144.
Int’l Crim. Trib. for Rwanda, Practice Direction on the Procedure for
Designation of the State in Which a Convicted Person is to Serve His/Her Sentence of
Imprisonment, ¶ 2(a), (as amended Sept. 23, 2008), available at http://www.unictr.org/
Portals/0/English%5CLegal%5CPractice%20Direction%5CEnglish%5Cdesignation_stat
e_08.pdf.
145.
Id. ¶ 2(a).
146.
Id. ¶ 2(b).
147.
Id. ¶ 3.
148.
Id.
149.
Id. ¶ 4.
150.
Id. ¶ 8.
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Sweden.151 In practice, sentences have been enforced in Benin and
Mali.152
As noted only briefly in previous scholarship,153 the ICTR differs
from the ICC and ICTY by explicitly providing for the enforcement of
sentences within Rwanda itself in Article 26 of its statute. 154 The
meaning of this article was illuminated in remarks made by the
registrar155 of the ICTR, Mr. Adama Dieng, during the signing of the
Rwandan Agreement on Enforcement of Sentences in Kigali in March
2008:
I know that some Rwandan authorities have claimed in the past, and
even now, that Rwanda should be the exclusive destination of ICTR’s
convicts, if one wants to give meaning to the maxim according to which
“…justice must be seen to be done”. But this disputation ought not to
take place, if one wants to defer to the choice made by the international
community which set up the ad hoc tribunals. The Security Council
decided that in respect of the former Yugoslavia, no convict would serve
his/her sentence in his/her country of origin. . . . As for Rwanda, the
position was not that drastic. But it was still decided that Rwanda
could qualify as a destination of ICTR convicts, just as any other
country which has expressed the wish to be considered for that purpose.
This of course, does not mean that Rwanda is forbidden to make its
case as the normal place of service of sentence for ICTR convicts. But it
will be up to the judges of ICTR, and particularly the President, based
on the merits of each case, to decide where the sentence will be served.
As the Registrar, I have no role in the decision making process, apart
from providing the President of ICTR with a full report regarding the
particular circumstances of each convict, and regarding the countries
which may potentially accommodate the convict.156

The registrar also addressed the criteria for prison designation:
The parameters to be taken into account when deciding the country for
the enforcement of sentence are now known. They are set forth in a
directive issued since May 2000 by the then President of ICTR. The
satisfaction of the victims is important but it is not the only factor
determinative of the choice of the place of service of sentence. The

151.
Detention of Suspects and Imprisonment of Convicted Persons [in] The
Detention Facility, supra note 139; Dieng, supra note 137, at 413 n.13.
152.
Status of Detainees, INT’L CRIM. TRIB. FOR RWANDA, http://www.unictr.org/
tabid/173/Default.aspx (last visited Oct. 18, 2013); Dieng, supra note 137, at 413.
153.
Penrose, supra note 98, at 636 n.83; May Margaret Penrose, Spandau
Revisited: The Question of Detention for International War Crimes, 16 N.Y.L. SCH. J.
HUM. RTS. 553, 566 (1999).
154.
ICTR Statute, supra note 84, at art. 26.
155.
The ICC, ICTY, and ICTR each have a “Registrar” who oversees the
Registry and thus all nonjudicial activities of the court or tribunal. See supra note 126.
156.
Adama Dieng, Registrar, Int’l Crim. Trib. for Rwanda, ICTR Registrar’s
Statement During the Signing of the Agreement on Enforcement of Sentence, ¶ 6 (Mar.
4, 2008), available at http://ictr-archive09.library.cornell.edu/ENGLISH/speeches/
dieng080304.html.
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whereabouts of the family of the convict are also a factor, as well as
many others, designed to protect competing interests.157

Dieng also stated that as a “fervent supporter of the Rwandan
reconciliation” he believed that an important step toward
reconciliation would include “having Rwandan convicts serve their
sentence in Rwanda, being visited by their relatives in Rwanda, and
eventually settling in Rwanda, upon completion of their prison
term.”158 Dieng further noted that Rwanda had recently completed
construction of a new prison facility that included a section dedicated
to ICTR convicts.159
Crucially, Dieng recognizes that prison location itself advances
the goals of transitional justice and victim-related restorative
justice. 160 He notes that “justice must be seen to be done” and
acknowledges that convicted individuals must be visible.161 He also
notes that the presence of sentenced convicts within Rwanda would
serve to assist in the “satisfaction of victims” as well as that of the
convict’s family.162 This Article will address the larger implications of
these insightful remarks in Part V.
C. Analysis: The International Prison Designation Paradigm
In reviewing the prison designation procedures of the ICC, ICTY,
and ICTR, a dominant international prison designation paradigm
emerges with the following characteristics:
As a threshold matter, sentences are not enforced within the “host
country” where the tribunal sits, and the tribunal therefore negotiates
bilateral enforcement agreements with other States. Host State
considerations effectively bar the ICTY and ICTR from such
enforcement in The Hague and in Arusha, respectively. For the ICC,
such enforcement is possible only when no other State is available.
Thus, based on a model enforcement agreement, the tribunal
negotiates the enforcement of sentence agreements with States that
have expressed a willingness to enforce sentences on a case-by-case
basis.
The first step in the international designation paradigm, then, is
that an appellate chamber renders a judgment and sentence with time
remaining to be served. The designation process begins once the
judicial process ends—at the conclusion of appellate proceedings
157.
Id. ¶ 7.
158.
Id. ¶ 9.
159.
See id. ¶ 10 (discussing ways Rwanda has eased fears associated with
transferring convicts into its country, including the construction of a new prison
facility).
160.
Id.
161.
Id. ¶ 6.
162.
Id. ¶ 7.
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resulting in a conviction and sentence with time remaining to be
served.
Second, the relevant sentencing materials are given to another
organ of the tribunal. Once a convicted individual’s sentence becomes
final, the relevant organ of the tribunal will balance a number of
factors in order to designate a State of enforcement from amongst the
States that have signed bilateral enforcement agreements. The
relevant organ is either the Presidency (ICC) or the Registry acting in
conjunction with the president (ICTY, ICTR).
Third, the tribunal designates a State of enforcement based on
minimum guarantees and discretionary factors. For the ICC, the
president must consider, inter alia, widely accepted international
treaty standards governing the treatment of prisoners as well as the
views and nationality of the sentenced person. For the ICTY and
ICTR, no strict statutory requirement exists. However, all three
tribunals consider discretionary factors such as the location of the
convicted individual’s family, his or her language abilities, and
medical or psychological reports regarding the person. Furthermore,
with regard to the specific State of enforcement, the ICTR presumes
that individuals serve their sentences in Rwanda itself, whereas
ICTY convicts may not serve their sentences in the former
Yugoslavia, and the ICC neither prohibits nor presumes enforcement
in any State.
Fourth and finally, the convicted individual is transferred to the
designated State of enforcement. Transfer occurs under the
supervision of the authorities of both the tribunal and State of
enforcement.163
IV. COMPARISON OF U.S. AND INTERNATIONAL PRISON
DESIGNATION PARADIGMS
To review, the essence of the U.S. and international prison
designation paradigms are:

163.
See, e.g., Agreement between the International Criminal Court and the
Government of the Kingdom of Denmark on the Enforcement of Sentences of the
International Criminal Court, art 3, July 5, 2012, ICC-Pres/12/02/12, available at
http://www.icc-cpi.int/NR/rdonlyres/D9462230-4163-4747-BC7C-CB0141C5004B/2847
20/Sentencing agreementwithDenmarkEng.pdf (“The Registrar of the Court, in
consultation with the competent national authorities of Denmark, shall make
appropriate arrangements for the proper conduct of delivery of the sentenced person
from the Court to the territory of Denmark.”).
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Threshold Matters

U.S. Paradigm
N/A

Step 1

A federal district court renders a
conviction and sentence.

Step 2

The relevant sentencing materials
are given to the BOP.

Step 3

The BOP designates a prison facility
based on minimum guarantees and
discretionary factors.

Step 4

The convicted individual is
transferred to the designated
facility.

1297

International Paradigm
Sentences are not enforced
within the host country.
The tribunal negotiates
bilateral enforcement
agreements with other States.
An appellate chamber renders a
judgment and sentence with
time remaining to be served.
The relevant sentencing
materials are given to another
organ of the tribunal.
The tribunal designates a State
of enforcement based on
minimum guarantees and
discretionary factors.
The convicted individual is
transferred to the designated
State of enforcement.

These two models provide the basis for further redressing the
prison designation omission in existing scholarship. Certain key
insights emerge from this comparison:
First, in both the United States and international paradigms,
nonjudicial bodies designate the place of imprisonment. In neither the
United States nor the international paradigm is the federal court or
international chamber itself designating a prison facility. In the U.S.
paradigm, only the BOP has authority to designate a prison facility
pursuant to the DSCC procedures outlined above. In the
international paradigm, the president and registrar of the tribunal
have such authority.
Second, designation often does not occur in the place where a
crime was committed. In the U.S. paradigm, federal authorities
possess statutory authority to designate outside of the location of
conviction, with a policy preference to designate within five hundred
miles of the convict’s release residence. The authority is even broader
in the international paradigm, where a convict could theoretically
serve a sentence in any corner of the globe, provided the country has
concluded an enforcement agreement with the tribunal. An ICTY
convict from Sarajevo, for example, could serve his sentence in
Finland, which is geographically, historically, and culturally remote
from the former Yugoslavia.
The rationale underlying location of imprisonment thus
contrasts with location of prosecution. Indeed, lex loci delictus—the
notion that someone should be tried in the location where the act was
committed—is an axiomatic principle of criminal justice. 164 Almost
164.
See FED. R. CRIM. P. 18 (“Unless a statute or these rules permit otherwise,
the government must prosecute an offense in a district where the offense was
committed. The court must set the place of trial within the district with due regard for
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indisputably, “the best judicial forum for [a] prosecution is the court
of the territory where the crime has been committed”165 because the
crime breaches the local values and legal rules of the given
community and goes against its public order, the victims reside there,
evidence is available there, there is a common language shared in
judicial proceedings, and any sentence the person serves can be in the
community, close to his or her family. 166 In both the U.S. and
international paradigms, however, the same has not held true for
enforcement of sentences. In the U.S. paradigm, considerations of
resources, geographic distribution of federal facilities, and the
varying levels of security at different institutions govern designation.
In the international paradigm, designation is constrained by the
tribunals’ role as a “backup” forum for criminal prosecution. Indeed,
the ICC only has jurisdiction if a State is “unwilling or unable” to
prosecute, 167 while the ICTY and ICTR exist because the former
Yugoslavia and Rwanda could not deliver justice during and after
their armed conflicts. Thus, in the absence of a competent domestic
prison system, international enforcement requires designation in
States other than those where the crimes were committed.
In fact, only the ICTR provides for enforcement in the region
where crimes occurred. As noted previously by the ICTR registrar,
location itself is integral to a notion that “justice must be seen to be
done” and that the interests of victims are relevant to prison
designation. Though neither the ICTY nor the Rome Statute provide
for enforcement of sentences in the State where crimes occurred,168
neither statute precludes enforcement of sentences in the State. For
example, Croatia could, pending Security Council approval, still
enforce sentences against its own nationals. The ICC provokes
further thought, as one of the six States with whom the court has

the convenience of the defendant, any victim, and the witnesses, and the prompt
administration of justice.”); 22 C.J.S. Criminal Law § 226 (2013) (“The place where the
crime was committed is determined by the nature of the offense and the location in
which acts constituting the offense occur.”); BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 995 (9th ed.
2009); Simona Grossi, Rethinking the Harmonization of Jurisdictional Rules, 86 TUL.
L. REV. 623, 635 (2012) (tracing the concept to the Justinian Code).
165.
Antonio Cassese, The Rationale for International Criminal Justice, in THE
OXFORD COMPANION TO INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL JUSTICE 123, 123 (Antonio Cassese
ed., 2009).
166.
Id.
167.
Rome Statute, supra note 81, at art. 17(1)(a).
168.
As noted above, Article 27 of the ICTY Statute only lists generally that
imprisonment occurs “in a State designated by the International Tribunal from a list of
States which have indicated to the Security Council their willingness to accept
convicted persons,” whereas Article 103(1)(a) of the Rome Statute mandates
imprisonment “in a State designated by the Court from a list of States which have
indicated to the Court their willingness to accept sentenced persons.” ICTY Statute,
supra note 84, at art. 27; Rome Statute, supra note 81, at art. 103(1)(a).
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concluded enforcement agreements could ultimately enforce the
sentence of a convicted individual.
Third, prison designation occurs pursuant to few mandatory
requirements and numerous discretionary considerations. In the U.S.
paradigm, only the standard of “minimum health and habitability”
governs the BOP’s choice of prison location. In the international
paradigm, the ICTY and ICTR lack concrete mandatory prison
designation requirements, whereas the ICC president shall consider,
inter alia, widely accepted international treaty standards governing
the treatment of prisoners. Both paradigms then contemplate a
number of discretionary factors, focusing largely on the
characteristics of the offender and the offense. For example, in both
models the relevant institutions consider the residences of the
offender, his or her family, or both.
Fourth, the characteristics of the offender and offense play a large
role in determining the location of imprisonment. In the U.S.
paradigm, the DSCC initially scores and then later varies inmate
classification based almost entirely on the characteristics of the
offender and nature of the offense itself. For example, the DSCC may
consider length of sentence, medical or psychiatric conditions, or
threat to government officials. In the international paradigm, the
tribunals similarly consider factors such as linguistic skills, medical
needs, or the location of relatives.
Fifth, the role of victims is not a central focus of prison
designation procedures. In the U.S. paradigm, victims may be
considered in the presentence report, though it is unclear how much
weight such statements are given. In the international paradigm,
neither the ICC nor the ICTY explicitly contemplates the role of
victims when designating a State of enforcement. Indeed, the decision
to designate a State of enforcement is based on factors such as
familial considerations of the convicted person, equitable distribution
between States, and the views and nationality of the sentenced
person. Only the ICTR scheme accommodates victims’ sense of “local
justice” by allowing Rwanda to enforce sentences. Though this victimrelated rationale was publicly explicated by the ICTR registrar in
2008, it is unclear the degree to which victims are considered during
the actual designation process.
Sixth and finally, the core rationales of criminal punishment are
not explicitly considered during the designation process. As noted
above, the U.S. paradigm accounts for all four core rationales of
criminal punishment, as the BOP is statutorily authorized to consider
just deserts, deterrence, incapacitation, and rehabilitation when
designating a prison location. However, DSCC practice never weighs
such considerations explicitly, though this does occur more implicitly
(i.e., the medical and psychiatric needs of a convict relate to
rehabilitation). The international paradigm, by contrast, does not
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explicitly consider the core rationales in its statutes, though its
discretionary factors may serve broader penological goals.
In sum, the following table reviews the above arguments and
findings:
1. Who designates?
2. Where?
3. Mandatory requirements?

4. Discretionary factors?
5. Offender/offense
characteristics considered?
6. Victims considered?
7. “Core rationales” considered?

U.S. Paradigm
BOP
Within five hundred miles of
release residence
“Minimum standards of
health and habitability”

Yes (wide variety of
considerations)
Yes
No
Yes (statute)
Somewhat (in practice)

International Paradigm
Registry/Presidency of the
tribunal
In States that concluded
enforcement agreements
Equitable distribution of
States, views/nationality of
sentenced person,
international treaty
standards (ICC).
None (ICTY, ICTR)
Yes (wide variety of
considerations)
Yes
Yes (ICTR)
No (ICTY, ICC)
No (statute)
Somewhat (in practice)

V. WHY PRISON LOCATION MATTERS IN THEORIES
OF CRIMINAL PUNISHMENT
The procedures and comparisons above partially rectify the
prison location omission by identifying the critical issues at stake
when a U.S. or international institution designates a particular place
of imprisonment. This Part goes a step further by begging the
question—What ends does this process serve? The scholarly failure to
address the prison location omission overlooks the relationship
between prison location—in both the international and domestic
realms—and broader criminal legal theory. This Article thus proceeds
with a final, central argument: prison location itself materially
advances rationales for criminal punishment.
As a preliminary matter, the aims of criminal sentencing are
distinct from the broader aims of criminal justice. As one scholar has
noted:
It is important to distinguish the aims of the criminal justice system
from the aims of sentencing . . . . The [criminal justice] system
encompasses a whole series of stages and decisions, from the initial
investigation of crime, through the various pre-trial processes, the
provisions of the criminal law, the trial, the forms of punishment, and
then post-sentence decisions concerned with, for example, supervision,
release from custody and recall procedures. It would hardly be possible
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to formulate a single meaningful ‘aim of the criminal justice system’
which applied to every stage.169

By contrast, four “core considerations” constitute the foundational
theoretical framework for understanding criminal sentencing—
namely: (1) deterrence of the defendant and others more generally, (2)
retributive just deserts for the committed crime, (3) incapacitation of
the criminal, and (4) rehabilitation of the offender.170 Given that the
U.S. Constitution is silent regarding penological theories, a sentence
may have multiple justifications and is open to the policymaking
process of state legislatures. 171 Indeed, as once noted by Justice
Kennedy: “The federal and state criminal systems have accorded
different weights at different times to the penological goals of
retribution, deterrence, incapacitation, and rehabilitation.”172 At the
international level, the ad hoc tribunals elucidate the theoretical
foundation of their sentencing decisions only in passing.173
For reasons explained below, this Part will also argue that prison
location strikes to the heart of two other emerging theories of
criminal punishment relating to victims and transitional justice.
What follows is a brief description of each of the six rationales,
followed by concrete arguments as to how and why prison location
advances each of these theories.174
A. Deterrence
The deterrence rationale focuses on the preventive consequences
of sentences. 175 Though some scholarship emphasizes individual
deterrence—preventing the same individual from committing the
same offense in the future—often the focus is on general deterrence—
deterring others from committing the same offense.176 Pursuant to

169.
ANDREW ASHWORTH, SENTENCING AND CRIMINAL JUSTICE 67 (4th ed. 2005).
170.
24 C.J.S. Criminal Law § 1997 (2013) (outlining the purposes of
punishment); MARKUS D. DUBBER & MARK G. KELMAN, AMERICAN CRIMINAL LAW:
CASES, STATUTES AND COMMENTS 7 (2d ed. 2008) (citing United States v. Blarek, 7 F.
Supp. 2d 192, 198–99 (E.D.N.Y. 1998)); ASHWORTH, supra note 169, at 74 (critiquing
courts’ consideration of multiple purposes of sentencing but prioritizing one); DAVID R.
LYNCH, INSIDE THE CRIMINAL COURTS 239 (2004); David Michael Jaros, Perfecting
Criminal Markets, 112 COLUM. L. REV. 1947, 1951 n.10 (2012).
171.
24 C.J.S. Criminal Law § 1997 (2013).
172.
Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 999 (1991) (Kennedy, J., concurring).
173.
See D’ASCOLI, supra note 27, at 2–3, 34 (“[T]here is a serious need to reexamine the current justifications of punishment in international sentencing practice,
as recent approaches are confused and unclear and there is a lack of clarity from the ad
hoc Tribunals in addressing the fundamental issues of sentencing.”).
174.
The sketches of each rationale are of course very brief, as each alone has
been the subject of vast amounts of debate. See ASHWORTH, supra note 169, at 72–90
(explaining the rationales of sentencing).
175.
See id. at 75 (describing the deterrence rationale).
176.
See id. at 240 (distinguishing the two types of deterrence rationales).
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this utilitarian theory, most associated with Jeremy Bentham,
punishment may be justified if the benefits of deterrence outweigh
the pain inflicted on the punished individual and if the same benefits
cannot otherwise be achieved. 177 From this perspective, then, a
sentence must be precisely calculated to deter others from committing
a particular offense.178
Many academic discussions of the deterrent effect of sentences
have either focused on the length of the sentence or implicitly
assumed that this is what serves the deterrent effect. 179 However,
other elements of criminal justice also implicate the deterrence
rationale:
Sentences are not the only form of general deterrent flowing from the
criminal justice system. In some cases it is the process that is the
punishment—being prosecuted, appearing in court, receiving publicity
in the local newspaper—rather than the sentence itself. In some cases
the shame and embarrassment in relation to family and friends are
said to have a more powerful effect than the sentence itself.180

177.
Id.; see also PODGOR ET AL., supra note 9, at 5 (explaining that the severity
of punishment under deterrence theory may depend on the mental state of the
wrongdoer).
178.
ASHWORTH, supra note 169, at 75.
179.
Kelly Bedard & Eric Helland, The Location of Women’s Prisons and the
Deterrence Effect of “Harder” Time, 24 INT’L REV. L. & ECON. 147, 148 (2004) (“To the
best of our knowledge, there has been no systematic attempt to estimate the deterrence
effect of punitiveness other than incarceration length.”); see also, e.g., Allison Marston
Danner, Constructing a Hierarchy of Crimes in International Criminal Law Sentencing,
87 VA. L. REV. 415, 449 (2001) (“Without any empirical study, there is simply no
reliable way to determine how much deterrent effect a particular sentence will have,
even assuming that marginal differences in sentence length exert different deterrent
effects.”); Chad Flanders, Retribution and Reform, 70 MD. L. REV. 87, 106 (2010)
(“Certainly deterrence theory has always been able to justify indeterminately long
sentences. If a certain length of sentence is not deterring the crime sufficiently, then
there seems no reason on deterrence grounds not to punish those who commit that
crime much longer and much harsher.”); Erik Lillquist, Recasting Reasonable Doubt:
Decision Theory and the Virtues of Variability, 36 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 85, 155 (2002)
(“We can suppose that the length of the sentence for an accurate rape conviction here
will exceed the likely sentence for a theft conviction, in part because society has more
interest in deterring individual instances of rape than theft.”); Robert D. Sloane, The
Expressive Capacity of International Punishment: The Limits of the National Law
Analogy and the Potential of International Criminal Law, 43 STAN. J. INT'L L. 39, 77
(2007) (“Analysis of the viability and coherence of deterrence in ICL thus yields [an]
overarching conclusion[ ] relevant to sentencing . . . that while deterrence may offer
sound reasons to establish an international criminal justice system, it provides scant
‘guidance in determining the lengths of particular sentences.’”). But see Doug Keller,
Why the Prior Conviction Sentencing Enhancements in Illegal Re-Entry Cases are
Unjust and Unjustified (and Unreasonable Too), 51 B.C. L. REV. 719, 750 n.186 (2010)
(noting that a wide body of literature undermines the purported relationship between
sentence length and deterrence).
180.
ASHWORTH, supra note 169, at 79 (citing H.D. WILCOCK, DETERRENTS AND
INCENTIVES TO CRIME AMONG YOUTHS AGED 15–21 YEARS (1963)).
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This argument underscores the deterrent effect of prison
location. At the level of specific or individual deterrence, if a convicted
individual were placed in a location where he or she committed a
crime, which is usually where he or she resides, the continuing shame
and embarrassment of serving a sentence close to home may have a
more powerful deterrent effect than serving the sentence in a prison
in a remote location. With regard to general deterrence, on the other
hand, the effect of having a known member of the community
incarcerated for having committed a certain crime may deter others
in that same community from committing that same crime or other
offenses in the future.
Having said this—noting especially that “[w]hile it is easy to
show the failure of deterrence, it is very difficult to prove its
success”—preliminary empirical research suggests that greater
distance increases individual deterrent effect. 181 Only one study,
reviewing crime rates from 1980 to 1995, has investigated the link
between prison location and deterrence. The study reviewed the
distances between the prisons and the inmates’ places of residence,182
noting that distance reduced visitation by convicts’ families and
friends183 and that such reduced visitation was punitive unto itself.184
It concluded that increasing the average distance to a women’s prison
by forty miles reduces the female violent crime rate by approximately
6 percent. 185 The article also noted that reduced visitation was
neither the only nor even the major source of punishment, as indeed
“the threat of violence, reduced freedom, the physical environment
and so on are clearly punitive.”186
Other factors also suggest that physical distance may increase
specific deterrence. As reviewed above, international convicts are
placed in foreign countries, thus isolating them culturally and often
linguistically. Such a prolonged sense of “not belonging” would never
exist if the person were serving his or her sentence domestically. For
example, Dragomir Milošević—who was convicted of murder,
inhumane acts, and terror in 2007—was subsequently sent to Estonia

181.
See Jan Nemitz, The Law of Sentencing in International Criminal Law: The
Purposes of Sentencing and the Applicable Method for the Determination of the
Sentence, 4 Y.B. INT’L HUMANITARIAN L. 87, 91–92 (2001); see also JANET DINE ET AL.,
CASES AND MATERIALS ON CRIMINAL LAW 61 (2006) (noting the difficulty of measuring
a negative—“the incidence of those who do not commit crimes”).
182.
See Bedard & Helland, supra note 179, at 150 (explaining the methodology
of their study).
183.
See id. at 152–57 (noting, for example, that inmates incarcerated further
from their city of residence were less likely to receive visits and phone calls from family
and friends).
184.
See id. at 156–57 (noting the punitive nature of female inmates being
separated from their children).
185.
Id. at 165.
186.
Id. at 152.
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to serve his sentence of imprisonment. 187 Milošević unsuccessfully
petitioned the ICTY president to serve his sentence in another
country, arguing that financial constraints prohibited his wife and
other relatives from visiting and that a warmer climate would be
more agreeable for his age and health. 188 On the national level,
though less extreme, a person born and raised in one region of the
country may have difficulty adapting to life in another; the “five
hundred miles” preference is no guarantee, and even that distance
means someone from New York City could serve a sentence as far
away as the federal prison in Butner, North Carolina.
With regard to general deterrence, as noted above, the effect of
having a known member of the community incarcerated for having
committed a certain crime could deter other locals. At the
international level, for example, deterrence may be directed at three
audiences: the region where the crimes occurred, potential
perpetrators of mass atrocities in the world at large, and a narrower
Western audience monitoring the evolution of international criminal
jurisprudence. 189 A tribunal must therefore be mindful of these
audiences and the deterrent effect of its designation. If the goal is to
deter a Western audience, any European country may be suitable for
transfer; if the goal is deterrence in the region where the crimes
occurred, an “on the ground” designation would be superior.
In sum, prison location advances the deterrence rationale
because: (1) the shame of serving a sentence in a local community
may increase specific deterrence, (2) the publicity of serving a local
sentence may increase general deterrence, (3) preliminary research
and considerations of the designation paradigms suggest that greater
distance may increase specific deterrence, and (4) different prison
locations may deter different intended “audiences.”
B. Retribution
The retribution rationale focuses on the notion that a criminal
“gets what he or she deserves.”190 As such, this “an eye for an eye, a
tooth for a tooth” rationale hinges on an individual conceived with the
free will to choose right from wrong.191 Three key components ground

187.
Prosecutor v. Milošević, Case No. IT-98/29/1-ES, Decision on Dragomir
Milošević’s Request for Reconsideration of Order Designating State in Which He Is to
Serve His Sentence, ¶ 1 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Mar. 10, 2011).
188.
Id.
189.
Mark B. Harmon & Fergal Gaynor, Ordinary Sentences for Extraordinary
Crimes, 5 J. INT’L CRIM. JUST. 683, 695 (2007).
190.
PODGOR ET AL., supra note 9, at 5; DRESSLER, supra note 2, at 16.
191.
See DINE ET AL., supra note 181, at 60 (2006) (noting the core rationale
“that criminals are punished because they deserve to be”); LYNCH, supra note 170, at
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classical retributivist theory: (1) a punishment is given in response to
it being deserved, (2) the given punishment is appropriate for the
wrong action, and (3) the consequences of the punishment are
irrelevant. 192 Retributive theories consider the wrongfulness of the
act, the degree of harm that the act has caused, and the mental state
of the offender at the time of acting.193
Under the just deserts formulation of retribution, a punishment
is imposed to rectify the wrong of an individual who has broken the
social contract to restrain oneself from certain benefits gained outside
the law.194 In other words, justice demands that he or she “repay”
whatever the person has taken in a form of unjust enrichment.195
Under the communicative conception of retribution, punishment
helps to reassert that all human beings, including the individual
victimized by the criminal’s offense, have the same worth as all other
human beings:196
[This conception] looks not only to injuries to victims and to society as a
whole, but also to groups that may suffer special harm from individual
crimes, for example, racial or ethnic or religious groups. The theory is
both backward-looking—what did the victim deserve for his past
wrong—and forward-looking—how does punishment help to reaffirm
social bonds and fundamental social values and rules so that society
will in the future better promote recognition of everyone’s equal
worth.197

This conception is proportionate to the crime committed and the
gravity of such commission.198
Prison location amplifies the retribution of a criminal sentence.
First, it does so for the same reasons that it affects the deterrent
nature of a criminal sentence: the shame of being in the local
community or the difficulties of being removed from it may contribute
to the punitiveness of the sentence. Second, conditions of
imprisonment may vary widely between distinct prison locations and
in turn affect the retributive nature of the sentence.199 Indeed, “the

241 (contrasting the difference between being the victim of bad genes and choosing to
do wrong); Leviticus 24:17–22 (New Oxford Annotated).
192.
EASTON & PIPER, supra note 34, at 49.
193.
PODGOR ET AL., supra note 9, at 6.
194.
Id. at 5–6.
195.
Id.
196.
Id. at 6.
197.
Id.
198.
See ASHWORTH, supra note 169, at 84 (“[R]espect for individual rights
suggests that the duration of programmes should remain within the bounds set by
proportionality . . . .”).
199.
See Bedard & Helland, supra note 179, at 152 (“[I]nmates incarcerated
farther from their city of residence are less likely to receive visits and phone calls from
family and friends.”); Lynn M. Burley, History Repeats Itself in the Resurrection of
Prisoner Chain Gangs: Alabama's Experience Raises Eighth Amendment Concerns, 15
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threat of violence, reduced freedom, the physical environment and so
on are clearly punitive,”200 and the quality of prison facilities thus
correlates with the intensity of the retribution.201
As discussed above, quality is often noted only as a “floor,”
representing the lowest acceptable standard of prison quality. For
example, the former ICTR registrar has stated that “the ICTR
attaches great importance to the promotion of at least the minimum
standards of prisoners’ rights.”202 This Article contends that not only
the floor but in fact the spectrum—in which the floor represents the
lowest acceptable standard of prison quality and the “ceiling”
represents the highest level, beyond which the sentence loses
retributive effect—must be actively considered in prison designation
because this “sliding scale” impacts the retributive nature of the
sentence.
International authorities implicitly consider the spectrum of
prison quality when considering enforcement in various States. With
respect to the floor, the ICTR accommodates convicted individuals
who fear incarceration in Rwanda itself because they fear that they
will be murdered in jail. It almost goes without saying that death
goes far beyond the proportionality contemplated by a term of
imprisonment of years and drops below the floor of prison quality that
fundamentally alters the retribution of a sentence. With regard to the
ceiling, for the ICTY, Croatian prisoners could be treated to a hero’s
welcome upon arrival if their sentence were enforced in Croatia. This
would surpass the ceiling contemplated by a chamber in imposing a
term of years and weaken any sense of just deserts. This spectrum is
a looming issue for the ICC especially, whose enforcement
agreements require that prison conditions be no more or less
favorable than those convicted of similar offenses.203
The spectrum of prison quality—and its effect on retribution—
places an affirmative obligation on U.S. and international authorities
to actively monitor their own facilities. At the federal level, the BOP
must remain vigilant that every federal prison facility meets
“minimum standards of health and habitability.” 204 Furthermore,

LAW & INEQ. 127, 154 (1997) (“Prison policies that cut back on prison recreation and
education add to the retributive quality of incarceration.”).
200.
Bedard & Helland, supra note 179, at 152.
201.
See Burley, supra note 199, at 154 (“[P]risoner chain gangs . . . undeniably
serve a more immediate and simple purpose: retribution.”).
202.
Dieng, supra note 137, at 413.
203.
E.g., Agreement Between the International Criminal Court and the
Government of the Republic of Finland on the Enforcement of Sentences of the
International Criminal Court, I.C.C.-Fin., art. 6(1), April 24, 2011, ICC-PRES/07-01-11.
204.
18 U.S.C § 3621(b) (2012). What is intriguing here is that this provision
was amended, replacing the term “penal or correctional facility that meets minimum
standards of health and habitability established by the Bureau” with “suitable, and
appropriate institution, facility, or program, and where appropriate, to a home
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given that the BOP has authority to designate a prison facility that is
not itself federal, the BOP monitors institutions, such as private
prisons, which claim to perform either the same or better in terms of
quality. 205 International authorities also monitor the stark quality
differences between States. 206 Indeed, an ICTR convict could
plausibly serve his sentence in Sweden or in Swaziland, drastically
distinct countries.207 Such a wide discrepancy persists between prison

detention program.” H.R. REP NO. 101-681(I), §1404 (1990), reprinted in 1990
U.S.C.C.A.N. 6472, 6550. S. REP. NO. 98-225, at 141 (1984), reprinted in 1984
U.S.C.C.A.N. 3182, 3324–25 notes:
Proposed 18 U.S.C. [§] 3621(b) follows existing law in providing that the
authority to designate the place of confinement for Federal prisoners rests in
the Bureau of Prisons. The designated penal or correctional facility need not be
in the judicial district in which the prisoner was convicted and need not be
maintained by the Federal Government. Existing law provides that the Bureau
may designate a place of confinement that is available, appropriate, and
suitable. Section 3621(b) continues that discretionary authority with a new
requirement that the facility meet minimum standards of health and
habitability established by the Bureau of Prisons.
205.
See generally Developments in the Law—III. A Tale of Two Systems: Cost,
Quality, and Accountability in Private Prisons, 115 HARV. L. REV. 1868, 1882 (2002)
(“[P]rivate prisons are, if anything, more accountable for their constitutional violations
than are public prisons.”); Charles H. Logan, Well Kept: Comparing Quality of
Confinement in Private and Public Prisons, 83 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 577, 594
(1992) (“[T]he results across a wide range of evaluative measures tend to favour the
privately operated prison over . . . facilities operated by governmental entities.”); Scott
D. Camp & Dawn M. Daggett, Quality of Operations at Private and Public Prisons:
Using Trends in Inmate Misconduct to Compare Prisons, 7 JUST. RES. & POL. 27–51
(2005) (“The results demonstrated that the private prison did not perform as well as
the three comparison prisons in the public sector, on the whole. For certain measures,
the performance of the private prison was exemplary . . . .”).
206.
States: Documents and Visits, EUR. COMM. FOR THE PREVENTION OF
TORTURE, http://www.cpt.coe.int/en/states.htm (last visited Oct. 18, 2013); van Zyl
Smit, supra note 12, at 370–71 (reviewing the status and condition of ICTR and ICTY
detainees and convicted prisoners without considering the process by which individuals
may move from detention to imprisonment). Unforeseen circumstances in a place of
enforcement may increase the retributive nature of a criminal sentence. For example,
General Radislav Krstić, a Bosnian Serb convicted of genocide in Srebrenica in 1995,
was slashed across the neck in May 2010 while serving his prison sentence in the
United Kingdom. See Inmates ‘Plotted to Kill’ War Criminal Radislav Krstic, BBC
NEWS (Feb. 7, 2011), http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-england-bradford-west-yorkshire12382433; Radislav Krstic: Serbian War Criminal Attacked in British Jail, THE
TELEGRAPH (May 8, 2010), http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/uknews/crime/7694530/
Radislav-Krstic-Serbian-war-criminal-attacked-in-British-jail.html. Such conditions
have also been present within Bosnian prisons. See Rodić and 3 Others v. Bosnia and
Herzegovina, no. 22893/05, § 4 ECHR, 2008 (“The applicants alleged . . . that they had
been persecuted by their fellow prisoners from the time of their arrival in Zenica
Prison . . . .”).
207.
Agreement between the Kingdom of Swaziland and the United Nations on
the Enforcement of Sentences of the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda,
Swaz.-U.N., Aug. 30, 2000, 2122 U.N.T.S. 255; Agreement between the United Nations
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conditions of ICTY and ICTR inmates,208 which may explain why the
ICTR engages in capacity building for the prisons in Benin and
Mali. 209 Furthermore, members of the ICTY and ICTR Registry
always travel to the relevant State to evaluate quality before
concluding enforcement agreements with the States that have
expressed an interest in concluding such an agreement with the
tribunal.210 The European Committee for the Prevention of Torture
and Inhumane or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (CPT) also
supervises the conditions of imprisonment in the national systems
where ICTY convicts are serving their sentences, giving the ICTY a
concrete means by which to supervise the treatment of prisoners.211
In sum, prison location advances the retribution rationale
because: (1) the sentence is made more retributive by either the
shame of being in the local community or the difficulties of being
removed from it, (2) conditions of imprisonment may vary widely,
constituting a spectrum of prison quality, and thus (3) where a prison
facility falls on the spectrum amplifies or undermines the retribution
of the sentence.
C. Incapacitation
The incapacitation rationale emphasizes rendering a convicted
individual incapable of committing further offenses for substantial
periods of time.212 The aim is protection of the public, particularly

and the Government of Sweden on the Enforcement of Sentences of the International
Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, U.N.-Swed., Apr. 27, 2004, 2256 U.N.T.S. 405.
208.
See Weinberg de Roca & Rassi, supra note 12, at 43 (“The ICTY and ICTR
Rules . . . attempt to achieve consistency. Achieving consistency is particularly difficult
due to the wide range of countries involved in the incarceration scheme at the
tribunals, especially the ICTY.”).
209.
See Dieng, supra note 137, at 413 (“[T]he majority of convicts have been
transferred to Mail and Benin; these are two of the eight countries that have signed
agreements with the United Nations for the purpose of enforcing ICTR sentences.”).
Norway has similarly proposed amending the Rome Statute to allow for States with
lower prison quality to qualify for financial assistance in order to rectify this disparity.
See Asian-African Legal Consultative Organization, Mar. 30–31, 2010, Putrajaya,
Malay., Report of the Round Table Meeting of Legal Experts on the Review Conference
of the Rome State of the International Criminal Court, 41 (2010) [hereinafter AsianAfrican Legal Consultative Organization], available at http://www.aalco.int/
converted%20report%20ICC%202010/WorkingSession3.pdf (“Norway was concerned
that only a limited number of Stated had so far agreed to accept sentenced persons for
enforcement purposes.”).
210.
Author meeting with member of ICTY Registry (Jan. 10, 2013).
211.
See van Zyl Smit, supra note 12, at 370–71 (reviewing the status and
condition of ICTR and ICTY detainees and convicted prisoners without considering the
process by which individuals may move from detention to imprisonment).
212.
See ASHWORTH, supra note 169, at 80 (“A second possible rationale for
sentencing is to incapacitate offenders, that is, to deal with them in such a way as to
make them incapable of offending for substantial periods of time.”).
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from “dangerous” offenders, career criminals, and other persistent
offenders.213 In other words, the key is that “[a] criminal behind bars
cannot commit crimes in society”;214 retribution and deterrence are
not relevant to this end.215 Incapacitation is often seen as the primary
criterion justifying criminal punishment.216
The specific place of imprisonment strikes at the heart of
incapacitation. If the facility itself is not sound in terms of its
infrastructure or security protocols, the ultimate risk is escape. This
is not merely a theoretical consideration, as escape has occurred in
both the national and international arenas. In the U.S. federal
context, for example, the Metropolitan Correctional Center (MCC) in
downtown Chicago has had a history of similar escapes from its
facility.217 In 1985, two individuals convicted of murder had escaped
the facility by breaking a window and then descending through the
window using a rope made of bed sheets and an electrical cord.218 In
December 2012, two inmates also escaped from the prison.219 Though
the facility itself had been constructed in order to reduce the number
of blind spots for guards,220 clearly its structure, the security policies,
or both contributed to a failure of the MCC to serve its incapacitative
function.

213.
Id.
214.
Catherine M. Sharkey, Out of Sight, Out of Mind: Is Blind Faith in
Incapacitation Justified?, 105 YALE L.J. 1433, 1433 (2012).
215.
See LYNCH, supra note 170, at 240 (“Incapacitation does not seek to
rehabilitate or deter, it simply seeks to ‘remove the problem’ and thus provide relief.”).
But see EASTON & PIPER, supra note 34, at 132 (“[I]ncapacitation does not rest on a
particular theory of human nature, but it is still justifiable on utilitarian grounds, the
aim being to maximise happiness and restrain dangerous offenders, to protect the
majority of society by removing harmful individuals.”).
216.
24 C.J.S. Criminal Law § 1997 (2013) (citing State v. Cope, 129 P.3d 1241
(Idaho 2006); State v. Harrold, 722 P.2d 563 (Kan. 1986); State v. Hill, 431 So. 2d 871
(La. Ct. App. 1983); State v. Craig, 361 N.W.2d 206 (Neb. 1985); State v. Walker, 713
P.2d 666 (Or. Ct. App. 1986); State v. Anderson, 546 N.W.2d 395 (S.D. 1996); State v.
Taylor, 710 N.W.2d 466 (Wis. 2006)).
217.
MCC Chicago, FED. BUREAU OF PRISONS, http://www.bop.gov/locations/
institutions/ccc/index.jsp (last visited Oct. 18, 2013).
218.
See Don Babwin & Michael Tarm, Chicago Jail Escape Resembles 1985
Breakout, ASSOCIATED PRESS (Dec. 20, 2012), http://news.yahoo.com/chicago-jailescape-resembles-1985-break-085549910.html (“During the 1985 escape, two convicted
murderers used a weight to break a cell window, then shimmied down the side of the
Metropolitan Correctional Center using bed sheets and an electrical cord.”).
219.
See 2 Inmates Escape from Federal Prison in Chicago, USA TODAY (Dec. 18,
2012, 3:48 PM), http://www.usatoday.com/story/news/nation/2012/12/18/chicago-jailescape/1777905/ (“Two convicted bank robbers were on the run after using a knotted
rope or bed sheets to escape from a federal prison window high above downtown
Chicago . . . .”). See generally MCC Chicago, supra note 217.
220.
2 Inmates Escape from Federal Prison in Chicago, supra note 219 (“[The
building’s] triangular shape is supposed to reduce the number of blind spots for
guards . . . .”).
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In the international context, escape may be related to the specific
State of enforcement. Ranko Stanković, who the ICTY indicted in
June 1996, was referred pursuant to Rule 11 bis to the authorities of
Bosnia and Herzegovina for trial.221 In 2007, he was convicted and
sentenced to 20 years imprisonment for participating in the abuse of
women in Foča but escaped en route to a medical examination in May
2007.222 Though Stanković was ultimately found in January 2012 and
prosecuted on charges relating to his escape,223 it is clear that the
insufficient security of the Bosnian authorities led to a fundamental
failure of incapacitation.
In sum, prison location advances the incapacitation rationale
because the physical space where a person is incarcerated—including
its security vulnerabilities—dictates the effective removal of the
offender from society.
D. Rehabilitation
Rehabilitation involves a range of programs of treatment at
prisons, facilities dedicated to a convicted individual’s “improvement,”
or both.224 At the core of this utilitarian rationale is the notion that a
convict is a person of free will, capable of changing and positively
contributing to society. 225 Such improvement may involve the
modification of behaviors or attitudes, as well as the provision of
educational skills leading to future occupational opportunity. 226
Methods may include psychiatric care, drug addiction therapy,
academic training, or vocational education.227 The emphasis of this

221.
See Prosecutor v. Stanković, Decision on Referral of Case Under Rule 11
bis, Case No. IT-96-23/2-PT (May 17, 2005); INT’L CRIM. TRIB. FOR THE FORMER
YUGOSLAVIA, R. P. & EVID. 11 bis, U.N. Doc. IT/32/Rev. 43 (July 24, 2009) (providing for
the referral of an indictee to a domestic jurisdiction for trial). The referral pursuant to
Rule 11 bis allowed for Bosnia to have responsibility for enforcing the sentence. By
contrast, as noted in Part III infra, individuals who have been tried and convicted by
the ICTY may not be sent to any former Yugoslavian countries for the purpose of
enforcement of sentences.
222.
Stanković Sentenced for Prison Escape, BALKAN TRANSITIONAL JUST. (Dec.
24, 2012), http://www.balkaninsight.com/en/article/stankovic-sentenced-for-prisonescape.
223.
Id.; Court Enters Not Guilty Plea for Stanković, BALKAN TRANSITIONAL
JUST. (Sept. 26, 2012), http://www.balkaninsight.com/en/article/court-enters-not-guiltyplea-for-stankovic/btj-topic-criminal-justice-efforts-latest-headlines-right-column/5.
224.
See ASHWORTH, supra note 169, at 82 (“[R]ehabilitative theory is aimed at
those who are regarded as being in need of help and support.”).
225.
PODGOR ET AL., supra note 9, at 5. The theory is utilitarian because it
focuses on the future reduction of crime. DRESSLER, supra note 1, at 15.
226.
See ASHWORTH, supra note 169, at 82 (“Sometimes the focus is on the
modification of attitudes and of behavioural problems. Sometimes the aim is to provide
education or skills, in the belief that these might enable offenders to find occupations
other than crime.”).
227.
DRESSLER, supra note 1, at 15.
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rationale is on the needs of the offender as opposed to the gravity of
the offense committed228 or the immediate need to protect society.
In effect, rehabilitation assumes a “medical model” of crime.229 It
is enshrined in the International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights,230 though the U.S. Constitution itself does not mandate that a
sentencing court consider reformation or rehabilitation. 231 The
American approach for much of the last two centuries has been on
rehabilitation of the prisoner in hopes of protecting society against
any further crimes, though this approach has come under increasing
criticism of late.232
Distance from one’s family, place of residence, or home country
affects rehabilitation because it undermines the capacity of the
institution to effectively administer rehabilitative programs. Indeed,
if a person is imprisoned outside of his or her own country, “without
possibility of transfer to his or her own country, the offender may
have little real opportunity for effective rehabilitation or
reintegration.” 233 This has potentially dire consequences for the
convicted individual:
[T]o argue that an offender can spend several years in a foreign prison
and then, following deportation, immediately readapt to life at home
without correctional supervision, stretches credulity. Indeed, this
reasoning is why nations with modern criminal justice systems have
some type of parole, probation, or community supervision system for
domestic offenders. Without access to systems of meaningful
restoration and reintegration, justice remains elusive for the victim and
recidivism by the offender is more likely. The latter consequence
translates into greater risk of harm to the public; repeated contact with
the criminal justice system for the offender; heavier caseloads for police,
prosecutors, defense counsel, the bench, prisons, and community
correction agencies; and a greater criminal justice tax burden to be
borne by the public.234

228.
ASHWORTH, supra note 169, at 82.
229.
LYNCH, supra note 170, at 239.
230.
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights art. 10(3), opened for
signature Dec. 16, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171 (entered into force Mar. 23, 1976) (“The
penitentiary system shall comprise treatment of prisoners the essential aim of which
shall be their reformation and social rehabilitation. Juvenile offenders shall be
segregated from adults and be accorded treatment appropriate to their age and legal
status.”).
231.
See 24 C.J.S. Criminal Law § 1997 (2013) (citing United States v. Oxford,
735 F.2d 276, 278 (7th Cir. 1984) for the proposition that “the Constitution does not
mandate that every sentencing court consider [reformation and rehabilitation] when
imposing sentence”).
232.
DUBBER & KELMAN, supra note 170, at 8 (citing United States v. Blarek, 7
F. Supp. 2d 192, 200 (E.D.N.Y. 1998)).
233.
Mark Andrew Sherman, Some Thoughts on Restoration, Reintegration, and
Justice in the Transnational Context, 23 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 1397, 1399 (2000).
234.
Id. at 1400.
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Indeed, if a common approach to rehabilitation includes vocational
training, for example, What may the quality of such training be if it is
ill suited to the language of the convicted individual and divorced
from the economics of one’s home country?
Furthermore, the quality of the prison affects the degree of
rehabilitative, medical, psychological, educational, or vocational
programs. All of these considerations are at play, for example, in
Finland, which has a relatively well-considered prison rehabilitation
program. 235 Among others, Finland has enforced the sentence of
Momir Nikolić, who pleaded guilty in 2003 to the charge of
persecutions on political, racial, and religious grounds as a crime
against humanity, relating to the murder of Bosnian Muslim civilians
in Srebrenica and surrounding areas in 1995. 236 Nikolić was
ultimately sentenced to 20 years imprisonment.237 During his crossexamination in a subsequent ICTY proceeding, he testified:
If I were to be in—in a similar situation knowing what I know now,
trust me, I wouldn't be fooled by anyone. I wouldn't carry out anyone’s
order. I would simply flee if in the same situation.
….
But then, things were completely different. The situation was different,
and I carried out my superiors' orders, and by having done so I made
mistakes. As a human being I accepted that, and I believe anyone in
such a situation should. When things are fine and going well, one needs
to accept the praise. In case of mistakes, one needs to take the blame,
and I do to the extent of my guilt and the mistakes I made. I did that,
and I feel no regret for having done that. I felt much relieved once I
accepted my responsibility and said that I was sorry for what I had
done. In a way, I feel better.238

It is unclear to what degree Nikolić would have made such a
statement if he had been incarcerated in a place with fewer or no
rehabilitative programs.

235.
See European Comm. for the Prevention of Torture and Inhuman
Degrading Treatment or Punishment, Report to the Finnish Government on the Visit to
Finland Carried Out by the European Committee for the Prevention of Torture and
Inhuman or Degrading Treatment of Punishment (CPT) from 20 to 30 April 2008,
¶¶ 84, 121 (Jan. 20, 2009), available at http://www.cpt.coe.int/documents/fin/2009-05inf-eng.htm (“The delegation was impressed by the high quality of material conditions
in the establishment’s detention units . . . . Despite the age of the building, which dated
back to the 19th century, living conditions were very good. The patient accommodation
areas were bright, airy and impeccably clean. Further, the delegation noted efforts to
create a personalised environment.”).
236.
INT’L CRIM. TRIB. FOR THE FORMER YUGOSLAVIA, CASE INFORMATION SHEET:
MOMIR NIKOLIĆ “SREBRENICA” (IT-02-60/1), available at http://www.icty.org/x/cases/
nikolic/cis/en/ cis_nikolic_momir.pdf.
237.
Id. at 1 (detailing that Nikolić’s initial sentence of 27 years was reduced to
20 years on appeal).
238.
Prosecutor v. Karadžić, Case No. IT-02-60/1, Transcript of Record, at 24895
(Feb. 16 2012), available at http://www.icty.org/x/cases/karadzic/trans/en/120216IT.htm.
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In sum, prison location advances the rehabilitation rationale
because both distance and quality affect the nature of rehabilitative
programs.
E. Victim-Related Rationales
Victim-related rationales for criminal punishment, which involve
restoration and reparation, are gaining traction in recent decades due
to “the increasing recognition of the rights and needs of the victims of
crime.”239 Though they vary in conception and implementation, they
rest on the fundamental proposition that the central goal of
sentencing is justice to victims, meaning that all stakeholders become
involved in discussions of the appropriate response to the offense.240
Indeed, this increasingly popular framework “seeks to include the
victim in the process in an effort to make an offender appreciate the
significance of his crime, apologize and gain forgiveness.”241
Prison location plays a crucial restorative role for victims. One
commentator has raised such considerations in the context of
transnational prosecutions and extraditions:
When a nation refuses to extradite a national who has committed an
offense in another country, this situation leaves the victim without
practical recourse to justice, even if the offender is tried and convicted
in his or her own country. Similarly, if the foreign offender is
extradited, tried, and convicted in the requesting state, then the victim
cannot be made whole if the offender is transferred or deported. In
these situations, the offender is treated fairly, but the victim is not.242

Similarly, a convicted individual transferred out of the region or
country in which he or she committed a crime may similarly render
the victim incomplete. Thus, the words of the ICTR registrar ring
true once again: “justice must be seen to be done.” As he correctly
recognized, the process of enforcement of sentences must
accommodate the victims. Many victims require a sense of inclusion

239.
ASHWORTH, supra note 169, at 88; see EASTON & PIPER, supra note 34, at
180 (“The focus on victims in the last two decades has had two very different aspects:
one could be called a victims’ welfare approach . . . whilst the other approach is to give
victims a status to influence outcomes.”). The U.N. “Declaration on the Basic Principles
of Justice for Victims” exemplifies this trend. EASTON & PIPER, supra note 34, at 180–
81; Declaration of Basic Principles of Justice for Victims of Crime and Abuse of Power,
G.A. Res. 40/34, U.N. Doc. A/RES/40/34 (Nov. 29, 1985) (“The General
Assembly . . . [a]ffirms the necessity of adopting national and international measures
in order to secure the universal and effective recognition of, and respect for, the rights
of victims of crime and of abuse of power . . . .”).
240.
See ASHWORTH, supra note 169, at 90 (“[A] restorative justice agreement,
involving restoration of the victim and of the wider community, is intended to be
constructive rather than punitive.”). Relevant stakeholders would include the victim(s),
offender(s), their families, and the community, however community may be defined. Id.
241.
ORMEROD, supra note 15, at 5.
242.
Sherman, supra note 233, at 1399.
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in the prosecutorial process, as to be treated fairly means to be
geographically close to the proceedings themselves. A victim who is in
another country or five hundred miles from a release residence may
do neither.
Various theories of restorative justice underscore the importance
of prison location in serving larger goals of victim-related justice. For
example, victim–offender confrontation is a trend that has received
increased attention of late.243 First, it allows victims to convey hurt
and receive answers, providing an opportunity for victims to tell
criminals how the crime has affected their lives.244 Second, it avoids
the feeling of being “twice victimized” by a criminal justice system
focused on prosecuting offenders and overlooking any input from the
victims themselves.245 And finally, such confrontation may address
“emotional and material wounds left in the wake of a serious crime”
consistent with the broader finding that many victims prefer
restorative to retributive justice.246 In order for this to occur, victims
must be within a manageable distance of the place of incarceration.
In reality, the convict may be imprisoned prohibitively far, especially
given the various socioeconomic statuses of victims of crimes. Indeed,
the BOP has a preference for incarceration within five hundred miles
of the release residence; no analogous considerations weigh toward
distance from victims.
Victim considerations may balance in the other direction as well,
however, with victims preferring a farther distance from the convict.
For example, federal officials are statutorily required to inform
victims of the date on which an offender will be eligible for parole
and, if necessary, the scheduling of a release hearing for the
offender; 247 escape, work release, furlough, or any other form of
release of the offender from custody;248 or the death of the offender in
custody.249 Some European countries, furthermore, allow a victim to
request the detention of a prisoner in a location farther from their
own place of residence.250
In sum, prison location advances victim-related rationales
because: (1) a convict serving a sentence far from the victims may
undermine restorative justice, (2) opportunities for victim–offender

243.
Mark S. Umbreit, Survivors of Homicide Victims Confront Offenders, THE
CRIME VICTIMS REPORT (1997), in DOUGLAS E. BELOOF, VICTIMS IN CRIMINAL
PROCEDURE 679–80 (1999).
244.
Id. at 680–81.
245.
Id.
246.
Id.
247.
42 U.S.C. §§ 10607(c)(3)(G), (c)(5)(A) (2012).
248.
42 U.S.C. § 10607(c)(5)(B) (2012).
249.
42 U.S.C. § 10607(c)(5)(C) (2012).
250.
D’ASCOLI, supra note 27, at 135–40.
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confrontation are diminished, and (3) some victims may in fact prefer
greater distance from the offender.
F. Transitional Justice
Turning to the final rationale, international criminal justice
elevates an additional theory of criminal punishment: facilitating
transitional justice.251 Transitional justice may be defined as “judicial
and non-judicial measures . . . implemented . . . in order to redress
the legacies of massive human rights abuses.” 252 Criminal
prosecutions—at the domestic or international level—are one of the
key mechanisms that may advance that goal.253 In essence, in the
wake of an armed conflict in a given region, international criminal
justice—and its concomitant sentencing procedures—may advance
the ideal of reconciliation.254 Indeed,

251.
See Woods, supra note 12, at 656–57 (“International criminal law has
numerous goals . . . . These goals, in addition to retribution for past crimes, include
deterrence, rehabilitation, reconciliation, dissipating calls for revenge, individuation of
guilt, and establishing an accurate historical record. Several of these goals are distinct
from the goals of the domestic criminal regime . . . .”) (footnotes omitted).
252.
What is Transitional Justice?, INT’L CTR. FOR TRANSITIONAL JUST.,
http://ictj.org/about/transitional-justice (last visited Oct. 18, 2013) (“These measures
include criminal prosecutions, truth commissions, reparations programs, and various
kinds of institutional reforms.”).
253.
See Fannie LaFontaine, Transitional Justice, in THE OXFORD COMPANION
TO INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL JUSTICE, supra note 165, at 539 (“As for the main
transitional justice mechanisms, judicial proceedings, notably criminal prosecutions,
constitute a form of punitive policy the purpose of which is to repress international
crimes and/or serious human rights violations, according to the different courts’
mandates. These tribunals can be domestic, international or ‘mixed’ . . . .”). Other
mechanisms include truth and reconciliation commissions. Id.
254.
See M. Cherif Bassiouni, International Criminal Justice in Historical
Perspective: The Tension Between States’ Interests and the Pursuit of International
Justice, in THE OXFORD COMPANION TO INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL JUSTICE, supra note
165, at 140 (“Among the goals of international criminal justice are to: contribute to
peace and reconciliation, provide a remedy to victims and eventually some closure, and
to generate prevention through deterrence. Additionally, prevention is also
accomplished by memorialization.”). See generally Neha Jain, Between the Scylla and
Charybdis of Prosecution and Reconciliation: The Khmer Rouge Trials and the Promise
of International Criminal Justice, 20 DUKE J. COMP. & INT’L L. 247, 247 (2010) (“The
issue of ‘justice versus peace’ has long been at the center of the controversy on
international prosecutions for crimes in transitional and post-conflict societies.”);
Payam Akhavan, Justice and Reconciliation in the Great Lakes Region of Africa: The
Contribution of the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, 7 DUKE J. COMP. &
INT’L L. 325–26 (1997) (“Calamity acted as catalyst, however, and the post-Cold War
political context allowed for the unprecedented establishment . . . of two ad hoc
international criminal jurisdictions to punish serious violations of humanitarian law.”);
Yacob Haile-Mariam, The Quest for Justice and Reconciliation: The International
Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda and the Ethiopian High Court, 22 HASTINGS INT’L &
COMP. L. REV. 667, 668 (1999) (“[I]nternational humanitarian law applies to cases of
internal and external armed conflicts. It applies when war prevents people from
exercising their rights.”).
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[i]nternational criminal courts purport to fulfill much more than the
traditional objectives of national criminal law enforcement, such as
deterrence or retribution. At various times, these courts have expressed
their intention to produce a reliable historical record of the context of
international crime, to provide a venue for satisfying its many victims,
and to produce the socio-pedagogical effect of promoting a sense of
accountability for gross human rights violations. They have also
expressed their aspiration to make advances in ICL, and to achieve
objectives related to peace and security—such as stopping an ongoing
conflict—that are far removed from the normal concerns of national
criminal justice.255

The location of imprisonment is key to transitional justice,
especially if states previously involved in internal or international
armed conflict develop their enforcement systems to the point of
enforcing international criminal sentences. Serbia, for example, has
pressed on multiple occasions for the Security Council to change the
rule precluding former Yugoslavian countries from enforcing
sentences. 256 In making its argument in June 2012, for example,
Serbia noted that it achieved “full cooperation” with the ICTY and, in
doing so, “contributed to the achievement of international justice and
further normalization of the situation and improvement of relations
between the states of the Balkans.”257 Serbia thus stated:
My Government will continue to work on the initiative that countries of
the former Yugoslavia be allowed to sign agreements on enforcement of
sentences with the Tribunal. It is evident that Serbia, as well as the
whole region, has changed to a great extent since the time when the
[Secretary General on] 3 May 1993 stated that he is of the view that the
enforcement of sentences should take place outside the territory of the
former Yugoslavia. . . . [T]he Republic of Serbia is ready to share the
responsibility with other countries in regard to this issue. We believe
that Serbia and other countries of the former Yugoslavia willing to do
the same will be allowed to sign agreement on enforcement of sentences
with the Tribunal.258

Here Serbia links prison location to the ideal of transitional
justice in the former Yugoslavia. In their submission, the mere
responsibility of enforcing sentences—as opposed to trying the

255.
Mirjan Damaška, Problematic Features of International Criminal
Procedure, in THE OXFORD COMPANION TO INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL JUSTICE, supra
note 165, at 177.
256.
See Feodor Starčević, Permanent Rep. of Republic of Serb., Statement
dated June 7, 2012 to the Security Council (June 7, 2012) [hereinafter Starčević
Statement], available at http://www.un.int/serbia/Statements/129.pdf; Marija Ristić,
Serbia Wants ICTY Convicts in Local Prisons, BALKAN TRANSITIONAL JUST. (Dec. 3,
2012),
http://www.balkaninsight.com/en/article/serbia-wants-icty-convicts-to-servcesentence-in-serbia (“The Serbian National Council for ICTY Cooperation has requested
several times for Serbia to be listed among countries were [sic] the ICTY convicts could
serve their sentences.”).
257.
See Starčević Statement, supra note 256.
258.
Id.
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individual and delivering the appropriate sentence—may bring
greater peace and reconciliation to the formerly war-torn region.
In sum, prison location advances the transitional justice
rationale because it allows countries to themselves foster
reconciliation, build capacity in their judicial and nonjudicial
institutions, and demonstrate their commitment to the rule of law.
VI. CONCLUSION
Where should a convict serve time? And why does it matter? The
short answer is that prison location is as important as duration in
determining whether and to what extent a convict is being
appropriately punished.
The prison location omission constitutes a conspicuous scholarly
oversight neglecting the importance of prison location. This Article
has filled this gap by explicating relevant prison designation
procedures at the national and international level and by showing
how prison location advances overarching theories of criminal
punishment. Just as sentence length directly implicates retribution,
deterrence, and other rationales for criminal punishment, so too does
imprisonment location.
In light of this review, this Article calls for renewed academic
attention to the importance of prison location. Future commentary
may scrutinize the statutory practice of U.S. states, given that, as
noted in Part II, some U.S. states endow courts with the power to
designate a particular prison facility. 259 Might state courts more
explicitly consider the deterrent effect of prison location, in addition
to length of imprisonment? Future research could also probe more
deeply into the designation statistics at the federal and international
levels, reviewing the numbers and distribution of convicts across the
field of potential prison locations. It could also pursue a more
empirical track, for example, such as that forged by the study that
concluded that increasing the average distance to a women’s prison
by forty miles reduces the female violent crime rate by approximately
6 percent.260 Might similar changes to a crime rate be perceptible if,
for example, the quality of rehabilitation were higher or lower,
especially if such rehabilitation were limited by culture or language?
This Article also demonstrates the need for reform. As suggested
above, prison location has significant consequences for the convict,
victims, and families of both parties. In light of this, the BOP must

259.
See supra note 28.
260.
See Bedard & Helland, supra note 179, at 165 (“When the full set of law
enforcement and socioeconomic variables are included, the estimates imply a 6.8%
reduction in violent crime . . . for a 40-mile increase in average prison distance.”).
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provide a more transparent, public explication of its designation
procedures and the way in which they may accommodate retribution,
deterrence, and other goals of criminal justice so as to be better
tailored to the needs of the particular individual and victims. Such
reforms would then “trickle down” to convicted individuals and
victims. Indeed, at the federal level, there has been limited review of
ways in which attorneys may assist their clients in ending up in a
particular prison facility,261 and one practitioner has already noted
the challenges for attorneys representing clients designated pursuant
to the DSCC process.262
At the international level, a fuller consideration of prison
location illuminates the path forward for the ICC and the MICT, both
permanent institutions that will soon have designatory and
supervisory authority over hundreds of international prisoners. 263

261.
See generally Alan Ellis, Securing the Best Placement and Earliest Release,
22 CRIM. JUST. 53 (2008) (“There is a lot defense attorneys can do to ensure that their
clients do their time in the best possible facilities.”).
262.
Allen Ellis, a prominent postconviction attorney, has noted:
While this new system may be cost-effective for the Bureau, it makes it more
difficult for defense counsel to help clients receive particular designations.
Under the old system, an attorney could always call the regional designator to
discuss particular areas of concern. That level of personal attention is not
always possible for many attorneys unfamiliar with the BOP under the new
system. It is often not possible for them to speak with the specific senior
designator assigned to a particular client because designations are randomly
divided between the seven senior designators. Attorneys who are not personally
acquainted with the senior designators are limited to speaking with someone
on the team responsible for the pertinent judicial district.
Ellis, supra note 50, at 60–61. Preliminary research has also indicated that some U.S.
states have not even made explicit their reasons for designating a particular prison
facility, but continued scholarly review could provide a stronger motivation for states to
do so.
263.
The MICT is the successor institution to the ICTY and ICTR and will have
designatory and supervisory authority over the tribunals’ sentences after July 2013.
Article 25 of the Statute of the International Residual Mechanism for Criminal
Tribunals provides:
1. Imprisonment shall be served in a State designated by the Mechanism from
a list of States with which the United Nations has agreements for this purpose.
Such imprisonment shall be in accordance with the applicable law of the State
concerned, subject to the supervision of the Mechanism. 2. The Mechanism
shall have the power to supervise the enforcement of sentences pronounced by
the ICTY, the ICTR or the Mechanism, including the implementation of
sentence enforcement agreements entered into by the United Nations with
Member States, and other agreements with international and regional
organizations and other appropriate organisations and bodies.
Statute of the International Residual Mechansim for Criminal Tribunals art. 25, S.C.
Res. 1966, Annex 1, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1966 (Dec. 22, 2010); MECHANISM FOR INT’L CRIM.
TRIBS., R. P. & EVID. 127–28, U.N. Doc. MICT/1 (June 8, 2012) (governing the place of
imprisonment and supervision of imprisonment).
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Sustained academic attention may also, hopefully, encourage more
States to ratify bilateral enforcement agreements with the tribunals
and ultimately accept more prisoners. Indeed, as of now, States Party
to the Rome Statute are calling on more States to ratify such
agreements. 264 The ICTY is similarly calling on States to be more
willing to enforce sentences. 265 More States ratifying enforcement
agreements means more opportunity for tribunals to designate a
State that best balances the needs of the offender and victims while
also being mindful of the key rationales of criminal punishment.
Finally, scholarly scrutiny may impact the evolution of
jurisprudence in this area. Some federal appellate jurisprudence
holds that a convict has no constitutional or other right to serve a
term of imprisonment in a particular prison facility, a certain type of
facility, or in close proximity to his or her family.266 And yet, federal
jurisprudence is equally clear that sentences must be proportional
under the Eighth Amendment,267 while other courts have held that
prison conditions may constitute cruel and unusual punishment,268

264.
See Asian-African Legal Consultative Organization, supra note 209, at 41
(“Norway was concerned that only a limited number of States had so far agreed to
accept sentenced persons for enforcement purposes.”).
265.
In a June 2011 address to the Security Council, Judge Patrick Robinson
stated:
The third area in which we need the support of the Member States of the
Security Council is in the enforcement of our sentences. The Tribunal has
signed enforcement of sentence agreements with 17 States, most of which have
been enforcing our sentences for years. We are very grateful for that. However,
some of these States have become hesitant to enforce further sentences and
have called for a more equal burden sharing among Member States. Other
States have signaled that they would only enforce a fixed number of sentences
at any one time, and have declined the Tribunal’s requests to receive additional
convicted persons. Considering that up to 40 additional sentences may have to
be enforced over the next few years, depending upon the outcome of trials and
appeals, it has become evident that the Tribunal’s current enforcement capacity
is rapidly approaching its limit.
Judge Patrick Robinson, President, Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia, Address to
the U.N. Security Council 4 (June 18, 2011), available at http://www.icty.org/x/file/Press/
Statements%20and%20Speeches/President/110606_pdt_robinson_un_sc.pdf.
266.
24 C.J.S. Criminal Law § 2188 (2013) (citing Meachum v. Fano, 427 U.S.
215, 224–25 (1976)); 24 C.J.S. Criminal Law § 2188 (2013) (citing Petition of Peiffer,
166 A.2d 325, 327 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1960)); see also McKune v. Lile, 536 U.S. 24, 39
(2002) (“It is well settled that the decision where to house inmates is at the core of
prison administrators’ expertise.”).
267.
See, e.g., Kennedy v. Louisiana, 554 U.S. 407, 419 (2008) (“[T]he basic
precept of justice [is] that punishment for [a] crime should be graduated and
proportioned to [the] offense.”) (internal quotation marks omitted) (internal citations
omitted); see also Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 592 (1977) (“[T]he Eighth
Amendment bars . . . those punishments that are . . . ‘excessive’ in relation to the crime
committed.”).
268.
See, e.g., William H. Danne, Jr., Comment Note, Prison Conditions as
Amounting to Cruel and Unusual Punishment 51 A.L.R.3d 111 (2013) (citing Wilson v.
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suggesting that location-related issues could theoretically be
construed
to
implicate
proportionality.
Furthermore,
the
jurisprudence may evolve to better accommodate victims, affecting
the BOP’s preference for incarceration within five hundred miles of
the release residence but lack of an analogous consideration for
distance from victims. In Kelly v. Robinson, for example, the Supreme
Court considered whether a Connecticut restitution order constituted
a fine or other penalty “for the benefit of a governmental unit”
pursuant to § 523(a)(7) of the Bankruptcy Code.269 In doing so, the
court reasoned:
The criminal justice system is not operated primarily for the benefit of
victims, but for the benefit of society as a whole. Thus, it is concerned
not only with punishing the offender, but also with rehabilitating
him.Although restitution does resemble a judgment “for the benefit of”
the victim, . . . . [t]he victim has no control over the amount of
restitution awarded or over the decision to award restitution. Moreover,
the decision to impose restitution generally does not turn on the
victim's injury, but on the penal goals of the State and the situation of
the defendant.
....
Because criminal proceedings focus on the State’s interests in
rehabilitation and punishment, rather than the victim’s desire for
compensation, we conclude that restitution orders imposed in such
proceedings operate “for the benefit of” the State. Similarly, they are
not assessed “for . . . compensation” of the victim. The sentence
following a criminal conviction necessarily considers the penal and
rehabilitative interests of the State. Those interests are sufficient to
place restitution orders within the meaning of § 523(a)(7).270

Although in a restitution context, the Court maintained a key
distinction: though criminal punishment may “benefit” the victim, the
victim may not dictate the nature of a criminal punishment. The
aspiration of this Article is that a fuller conception of prison location
may someday serve to benefit both victims and society as a whole.

Seiter, 501 U.S. 294 (1991); Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97 (1976); Jackson v. Bishop,
404 F.2d 571 (8th Cir. 2008); De’Lonta v. Angelone, 330 F.3d 630 (4th Cir. 2003);
Bagola v. Kindt, 131 F.3d 632 (7th Cir. 1997)) (“[M]odern courts in general have
overwhelmingly subscribed to the view that those confined within penal institutions
can be subjected to cruel and unusual punishment by reason of offensive practices,
treatments, or conditions which originate within the prison setting itself and are not in
any way mandated by the express terms of a court-imposed sentence.”).
269.
Kelly v. Robinson, 479 U.S. 36, 38–43 (1986).
270.
Id. at 52–53 (footnote omitted).
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